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INTRODUCTION
Trademark law has to address “overlapping” rights in a number of contexts. Thus, both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Justice
of the European Union have in recent years tackled the prospect that trademark rights in product shapes might effectively extend the life of patented
inventions,1 or the concern that limits in copyright law might be evaded
through assertion of trademark-like claims as regards copyrightable subject
matter.2 In Europe, where design law is a more prominent part of intellectual property disputes, the relationship between trademark law and design
law is also heavily contested.3
And disputes about the overlap of rights under trademark and unfair
competition law are also on the horizon on both sides of the Atlantic: the
European debate implicates allocation of authority between EU and national
law,4 while in the United States, resolution of the constitutionality of the
exclusion from registration of disparaging marks might force the courts to
confront in a new context the character of residual use-based rights in a system where such rights have been overlaid by a federal registration scheme.5
1 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Joined Cases C337/12P–C-340/12P, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Indus. Co., EU:C:2014:129; Case C48/09, Lego Juris v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. I-8403; Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs.
NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R I-5475. This debate is not new. See
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249
(1945); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg.
Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
2 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); Case C205/13, Hauck GmbH v. Stokke, EU:C:2014:2233. For a pending case in Europe, see Case
E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo, 2016 EFTA Ct. (a challenge to the trademark registration of
iconic sculptural works in which copyright had expired). See generally Martin Senftleben,
Public Domain Preservation in EU Trademark Law—A Model for Other Regions?, 103 TRADEMARK
REP. 775 (2013).
3 See, e.g., London Taxi Corp. v Frazer-Nash & Anor [2016] EWHC (Ch) 52 (Eng.).
4 See Case C-661/11, Martin Y Paz Diffusion SA v. Depuydt, 2013 E.C.R. 577, ¶ 61;
Lego Juris, 2010 E.C.R. I-8403, ¶ 61; Joined Cases C-236/08–C-238/08, Google France SARL
v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶ 57; Phillip Johnson & Johanna Gibson,
The “New” Tort of Passing Off, 131 L.Q. REV. 476 (2015).
5 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (mem.); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439
(E.D. Va. 2015); see also Renna v. Cty. of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310 (D.N.J. 2014). See
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The overlap tackled in this Article—the territorial overlap of competing
trademark rights—might be viewed in part through the registration/use
prism. Certainly, one of the contexts where territorial disputes are most
acute is where the reach of a registration is not closely coextensive with the
area of trademark use. But this Article seeks to explore the territorial overlap
problem more broadly.
Resolving a conflict between two similar rights that overlap (whether territorially or otherwise) is perhaps more central to trademark law than other
intellectual property regimes.6 The fact that an applicant for a trademark
would notionally infringe an earlier right is a so-called relative ground for
denial of the later registration, and such assessments are a crucial and significant part of trademark law. 7 Indeed, they are becoming even more frequent
as the register and the marketplace become choked with a greater number of
generally Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867 (2017).
6 This is, of course, a matter of degree. The existence of earlier rights (among other
earlier items of relevant prior art) is of significance in patent law in particular. But with
trademark law, and the ongoing mediation of competing rights of ownership—sometimes
in the same “sign” used for the same goods—the notion of overlapping trademark rights is
a more ever-present question. Likewise, patent disputes can occasionally give rise to what
might be called “territorial overlaps,” especially if we construe “rights” to include rights of
third parties to use an invention without authorization. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research In
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). But disputes between different owners of a
patent on the same invention in different territories will be rare in comparison with the
analogous contest in trademark law.
7 See Directive 2015/2436, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Dec. 16,
2015, to Approximate the Laws of the Members States Relating to Trade Marks, art. 5, 2015
O.J. (L 336/1) (EU) [hereinafter Recast EU Trade Mark Directive]. The Recast EU Trade
Mark Directive replaced Directive 2008/95 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of Oct. 22, 2008, to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks,
2008 O.J. (L 299/25) (EC) [hereinafter 2008 Trade Mark Directive], but does not need to
be transposed into national laws until January 2019. For the relative rights provision in the
2008 Trade Mark Directive, see id. art. 4; see also Council Regulation 207/2009 of Feb. 22,
2009, on the Community Trade Mark, art. 8, 2009 O.J. (L 78/1) (EC) [hereinafter Community Trade Mark Regulation or CTMR], as amended by Regulation 2015/2424 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of Dec. 16, 2015, Amending Council Regulation
207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark (EC) and Commission Regulation 2868/95
Implementing Council Regulation 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark (EC), and
Repealing Commission Regulation 2869/95 on the Fees Payable to the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (EC), 2015 O.J. (L 341/21)
(EU) [hereinafter Amending Trade Mark Regulation or ATMR]. The ATMR amended the
CTMR, but there is no official codified version of the CTMR, and the amendment
included the change of the name of the CTMR to the European Union Trade Mark Regulation (by which the amending instrument is also sometimes called). To avoid confusion,
in this Article, the Regulation containing the substance of EU law governing EU Trademarks at any time since 1996 will be referred to as the “EUTMR” unless historical context
requires specific reference to the predecessor version of the instrument, whether the
CTMR or its 1994 antecedent, in which case “CTMR” will be used. For U.S. law, see 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012). U.S. copyright law does have one parallel provision. See 17
U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (denying copyright protection for parts of work that are themselves
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marks of increasing scope.8 Thus, this Article’s treatment of the territorial
overlap of rights—one dimension along which there may be dwindling space
for new marks—might also be considered as part of the ongoing debate
about so-called trademark “clutter.”
One cause of the increasing conflict between overlapping trademark
rights is the trend in international trademark law to develop (mostly, but not
entirely, administrative) mechanisms designed to extend rights more easily
and more quickly beyond the borders of a single nation-state. These efforts
reflect pressures caused by global trade and digital commerce. 9 If brands
are known and sold globally, as the Internet has facilitated with many goods
and services, then limiting the reach of trademarks to national borders is
seen by many as anachronistic.10 And even when producers are not yet operating globally, some of the trademark mechanisms are consciously touted as
part of a normative industrial policy of encouraging expansion of trading activities beyond national borders. Extending the territorial reach of rights often
occurs in advance of actual expansion of trade.
But these mechanisms, purportedly prompted by and designed to further international trade, can cause problems that both hinder trade and
arguably undermine competing social and economic norms (especially as the
normative effects of unthinking internationalization are increasingly questioned). The difficulties caused are particularly acute when rights have been
granted in systems that do not require use in order to secure a trademark
registration, and where registrations are of ever greater reach. This is true of
the European Union Trade Mark system, which is one such mechanism
designed to extend the geographic scope of rights beyond the nation-state.
Under that arrangement, a single application can secure a right valid
throughout the entire territory of the European Union and that can be
enforced in one proceeding via the grant of an EU-wide injunction even without the plaintiff having used its mark.11 The application can be filed without
infringing). See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997).
8 See Barton Beebe & Jeanne Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical
Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
9 See Danny Friedmann, The Uniqueness of the Trade Mark: A Critical Analysis of the Specificity and Territoriality Principles, 38 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 678, 678 (2016) (“Because of
globalisation and the internet, proprietors have a need to extend the use of their trade
mark to other countries . . . .”).
10 See id. at 679 (“In an ideal world there would be a global trade mark system where
only trade marks are registered that are truly unique . . . . Because of path dependency,
state sovereignty and institutional interests, the territorialism of trade mark systems is difficult to overcome.”).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 46–69. National systems within the European
Union can under the Trade Mark Directive require intent to use as a precondition to
application. See, e.g., Trade Marks Act 1994, § 32(3) (Eng.). Whether the EUTM system
should adopt an “intent to use” requirement was part of the policy debate in the context of
the Max Planck Study that prompted the 2015 reforms, but those reforms did not enact
such a requirement.
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even possessing an intent to use the mark in question and the territorial
scope of the resulting European Union Trade Mark (or EUTM, formerly
called a Community Trade Mark or CTM) is defined by the external political
boundaries of the EU, which now encompasses twenty-eight member states.12
Despite this, courts in the European Union have in a number of recent
cases resisted some of the innovations of the EU system and have affirmed
the enduring pull of a different conception of territoriality. This Article
defends many of these acts of resistance, and supports further modifications
of the EU model, in part because of the increased problem of overlapping
rights. That increased overlap requires a critical reading of these innovative
mechanisms and attention to a broader range of values in implementing the
model. These propositions are supported both by a more theoretically complex conception of trademark territoriality 13 and a richer normative account
of the European project (itself, these days, a project in flux and one about
which, from Britain, it is hard to write without profound melancholy).14
I. TRADEMARK TERRITORIALITY
Trademark protection is territorial.15 Indeed, it is a cardinal principle
that all intellectual property law is territorial.16 It has been since at least the
Paris Convention in 1883 or the Berne Convention in 1886,17 both of which
are foundational international agreements that perhaps paradoxically
12 Until 2016, the trademark covering the entire EU was referred to as a Community
Trade Mark. Since March 23, 2016, the CTM is now known as the European Union Trade
Mark. See ATMR, supra note 7, arts. 1(1)–(2). In this Article, I use the term EUTM to refer
to any such mark unless historical context requires use of CTM.
13 See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law
From the Nation State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885 (2004).
14 See Michel Vivant, Building a Common Culture of IP?, 47 IIC 259 (2016) (“IP must be
thought of as a global tool where the principle of territoriality remains dominant. On a
European level we try to build a common IP law when we are dealing with Grexit or Brexit
and a form of breakup of the European Union.”).
15 This proposition has multiple dimensions to it, and courts and commentators too
frequently ignore the complexity of the proposition. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 13
(highlighting the different conceptions of territoriality at play in trademark law, and
describing those as “intrinsic” and “political” conceptions of territoriality).
16 As to trademark law, see United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98
(1918) (“[T]hat a trade-mark right is not limited in its enjoyment by territorial bounds, is
true only in the sense that wherever the trade goes, attended by the use of the mark, the
right of the trader . . . will be sustained.”); Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 628 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[Our holding] is consistent with the
fundamental doctrine of territoriality upon which our trademark law is presently based.”);
Case C-149/11, Leno Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV, EU:C:2012:422 (Sharpston,
A.G.) (“Trade mark protection is, quintessentially, territorial. That is because a trade mark
[registration] is a property right that protects a sign in a defined territory.”); 3 RUDOLF
CALLMANN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 20:26, at
20-163 (4th ed. 2013) (“The law of trademarks rests upon territoriality.”).
17 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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installed territoriality as the governing principle of international intellectual
property relations.18
International harmonization, which has become more intense since the
signing of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) over twenty years ago,19 has not interfered with the purity of
territoriality as a legal proposition. But global trade, and even more so an
online marketplace, has called into question the practical relevance of the
principle that trademark law is territorial. There is a growing gap between
the global reach of markets and the national scope of marks. (Much) trade is
actually international; trademarks are legally national, and historically
acquired and protected on a country-by-country basis. Such gaps between
law and commerce create costs and uncertainties.
Concern about gaps between local law and international commerce is
not new. Indeed, the Paris Convention itself was a response to pressures on
national systems created by international trade.20 And every so often in the
130 years since, litigants or scholars, policymakers or judges, have remarked
on the fact that we are living in a wholly different world, and that trademark
law must dramatically adapt. 21 What (if anything) is trademark law to do
about this apparent gap between commercial reality and legal principle?
How, if at all, should we reconfigure legal principle to comport with commercial reality?22
II. MECHANISMS

TO

MODERATE

THE

FORCE

OF

TERRITORIALITY

International and regional trademark law has developed a number of
mechanisms designed to facilitate trademark protection across borders,
18 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 29:25, at 29-67–29-68 (4th ed. 2004) (“[The Paris Convention] recognizes the principle
of the territoriality of trademarks . . . .”). See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 993 (2002).
19 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1197.
20 See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (1969).
21 Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569 n.19, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Friedrich-Karl Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 IIC 48, 48 (1970)
(noting “the dissimilarity between the strict territorial nature of present trademark protection and the international character of trade and commerce for which national boundaries
are of little consequence”); Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark
Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998) (arguing that “the territorial model of
trademark law . . . is an anachronism” in the global market); cf. Robin Jacob, International
Intellectual Property Litigation in the New Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 507, 508
(2000) (noting that it was “becoming apparent [by the 1970s] that intellectual property
laws, as purely local rights, were becoming inappropriate for single markets that crossed
national borders”).
22 Adjusting trademark to reflect commercial reality (and how to do it) might be a
more contested normative proposition than assumed by many. See Tushnet, supra note 5;
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Commercial Reality (Sept. 21, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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beyond substantive harmonization.23 Some, such as the protection of wellknown marks under the Paris Convention (first introduced in 1925), map
protection to actual reputation in the transnational marketplace.24 Others,
such as the priority period and telle quelle mechanisms under the Paris Convention,25 or the procedural reforms of the Trademark Law Treaty and the
Singapore Trademark Law Treaty, are designed to offer transnational protection by facilitating registration of marks on multiple national registers.26
This too explains the conceptual basis of the Madrid Protocol, 27 to which
the United States and the European Union adhered in 2002 and 2004,
respectively.28
The next step conceptually in efforts to facilitate truly transnational protection is the advent of so-called unitary (registered) rights that transcend
national borders. The EUTM is the leading exemplar of such rights. In
some respects, and at least if applied to a broad geographic space, this may
appear to be a quite radical approach to overcoming the territoriality of
national trademark rights. But in other respects it is reaffirmation of a territorial approach to trademarks, with the simple adjustment of the relevant
“territory.”
A conventional assessment of the conditions in which unitary rights have
grown up suggests that such adjustments are far easier, and perhaps more
likely to succeed, when certain political institutions exist (or are created) that
map in some way to the new territory.29 But one of the questions discussed
23 See generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW AND POLICY 133–34 (2d ed. 2008) (suggesting a typology reflecting the types of mechanisms found in trademark treaties). National laws developed their own mechanisms to
enable trade across internal borders within larger national units. Some of these were judicial innovations, revolving around liberal notions of use and zones of natural expansion,
but most notably this involved the creation of federal registration that conferred rights on
a nationwide basis. Both developments can be seen in the history of twentieth-century U.S.
trademark law. See Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 891–908.
24 See Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 6bis.
25 See id. art. 4 (priority); id. 6quinquies (telle quelle).
26 See Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, 2037 U.N.T.S. 35; Singapore Treaty on
the Law of Trademarks, Mar. 27, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-2 (2007).
27 Protocol Relating to Madrid Agreement Concerning International Registration of
Marks, June 27, 1989, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-41 (1990).
28 See Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758,
1913–21 (2002); Council Decision No. 2003/793, 2003 O.J. (L 296) (EC).
29 See, e.g., Tobias Cohen Jehoram et al., European Trademark Law § 2.6, at 19 (2010)
(discussing institutional arrangements in the Benelux). See generally Paul Craig, Integration,
Democracy, and Legitimacy, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 13 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de
Búrca eds., 2d ed. 2011) (explaining the development of the institutional structure of the
European Union). The institutions either existing within the European Union prior to the
creation of the EUTM (such as the European Commission and the Court of Justice), or
established by the EUTMR (such as the EUIPO and EUTM courts), differs in important
ways from the institutions that operate and sustain the system of “European patents” under
the European Patent Convention. See generally LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 381–86 (4th ed. 2014). And the EUTM and EPO model each differ in
important ways from the institutional apparatus recently put in place to create a system of
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briefly in Part VI of this Article is whether supranational political institutions
are sufficient to ensure the success of a system of unitary rights. 30 At the very
least, it is clear that the nature and form of those institutions and their relationship to national laws and institutions—and the relationship between the
unitary and national rights those institutions respectively administer—will
heavily inform the shape and success of the unitary system.31 More broadly,
political reform that moves too far ahead of underlying social and economic
patterns of exchange will appropriately result in a need to adapt the simple
unitary model (thus perhaps raising questions about alternative means of
pursuing similar objectives). These adaptations are important not only to
unitary patents throughout Europe. See Regulation No. 1257/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Dec. 17, 2013, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the
Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361/1) (EU); Council
Document No. 16351/12 of Jan. 11, 2013, Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J.
(C 175/1). The impending departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union
casts some doubt on whether the Unitary Patent (and Unified Patent Court system) will
ever come into being, and the institutional arrangements may at the very least need to be
revised. Cf. RICHARD GORDON & TOM PASCOE, OPINION ON THE EFFECT OF ‘BREXIT’ ON THE
UNITARY PATENT REGULATION AND THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT AGREEMENT (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://www.eip.com/assets/downloads/gordon-and-pascoe-advice-upca-34448129-1-.pdf;
Winfried Tilmann, EPUE-Reg and UPCA After Brexit, EPLAW PATENT BLOG (June 27, 2016),
http://eplaw.org/eu-winfried-tilmann-epue-reg-and-upca-after-brexit/.
30 Some of the proposed unitary schemes mentioned below, see infra text accompanying notes 71–74, were they to be pursued and successful, might also call into question
assumptions in the other direction about the extent to which full, up-front, formal institutional relationships need to be established. Each involves a much looser institutional infrastructure than the European Union. And in that respect these future unitary trademark
schemes might be models for the kind of arrangements that might have to be made if the
United Kingdom were to remain part of the Unified Patent Court system. Yet, the Court of
Justice of the European Union believes that—as a matter of fundamental EU constitutional
law, rather than optimal international patent policy—certain institutional dynamics
(including the coordinating authority of the Court of Justice in matters of EU law) are
essential. See Re Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court (Opinion 1/09), 3 C.M.L.R. 4 (2011). Although the court’s 1/09 decision may make it politically
impossible for the United Kingdom to remain within the Unitary Patent scheme (because
the continuing jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in even minor patent matters may be a
hard sell in the United Kingdom in the current climate), even within Europe at present,
other transnational institutional arrangements (such as those established under the European Free Trade Agreement) exist to further similar free trade objectives. Depending
upon broader political choices made over the next two years, those models may hint at the
conditions under which a possible revision of EU unitary rights to accommodate nonmember states might proceed. But most likely, the constitutional and political realities will
dictate that unitary rights will not extend to the United Kingdom after Brexit, regardless of
the merits of a unitary system based on looser political bonds. Cf. Aoife Coll, The EFTA
Court’s Role in Strengthening the Homogeneity Objective of the EEA Agreement: An Examination in
Light of Brexit, 22 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 119 (2016).
31 See infra text accompanying notes 51–59 (discussing the nature of EUTM courts and
provisions mediating relations between national and EU institutions); infra text accompanying notes 269–75 (discussing institutional design); infra note 272 (noting provisions on
treatment of counterpart national and EU marks).
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effectuate important objectives that might be thought to be internal or core
to any trademark system—such as how to handle overlapping rights—but
also to recognize a broader set of normative social commitments (whether
relating to industrial or cultural policy) too often submerged in formal trademark doctrine.
Unitary rights were pioneered in the European Union by the Benelux
countries, where a loose form of institutional reform was under way beyond
the limited sphere of intellectual property law.32 In 1963, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg recognized the substantial integration of their
national markets and created the Benelux trademark, a unitary right that
covered the entire territory of the three countries. Indeed, from the commencement of Benelux registrations in 1971, it was no longer possible for
traders to acquire national registered trademark rights in any of the three
constituent countries.33
In this last regard, the Benelux countries adopted a strategy different (at
least nominally) from that pursued by the United States, where state-conferred registrations could continue to exist even after Congress superimposed a comprehensive scheme of federal registration (which might be
thought of as the creation of unitary rights).34 In the United States, suppos32 See, e.g., Cohen Jehoram et al., supra note 29, § 3.1, at 21–22.
33 This required transitional provisions to deal with existing national rights, and inevitably the compromise included periods (sometimes indefinite) of coexistence. See, e.g., id.,
§ 3.3.2, at 28. Under the transitional provisions contained in the Uniform Benelux Law on
Marks (Articles 29–35), the exclusive right to a trademark acquired under the national law
of any of the three member states could be maintained, for the entire area of the Benelux,
provided that between entry into force of the Law (January 1, 1971) and December 31,
1971, the trademark owner filed an application before the Benelux Trademark Office
claiming (and proving) ownership of a prior national trademark and requesting the maintenance of its trademark for the extended territory covered by the Law. If successful, the
maintained trademark was registered as of January 1, 1971 (even if the request was filed
later on, so as to ensure priority of maintained trademarks over newly-filed trademarks).
In the event of failure to request the maintenance of a prior national trademark, ownership of the national trademark was lost. However, the Benelux registration emanating
from the prior national trademark would not extend to any country of the Benelux where
either (1) it would clash with a pre-1971 trademark that had also been maintained, or (2) it
would be deemed invalid, e.g., for lack of distinctiveness. If two identical trademarks from
two different countries were maintained, only one extended to the territory of the third
country, namely: (1) that which, prior to January 1, 1971, was first used in the third country; or (2) in the event of non-use in the third country, that which first acquired rights in its
country of prior registration. See Benelux Uniform Law on Marks arts. 30–35, Nov. 11,
1983, 704 U.N.T.S. 301, 356; ANTOINE BRAUN & EMMANUEL CORNU, PRÉCIS DES MARQUES: LA
CONVENTION BENELUX, LE DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE, LES LOIS PÉNALES ET LA COMPÉTENCE
CIVILE BELGES, LES CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES 693–712 (5th ed. 2009). Likewise, when
the European Union has expanded the reach of the EUTM with the accession of new
member states, coexistence has been an important policy tool, and it has largely worked
without great impediments to trade or uncertainty costs. See infra text accompanying notes
298–99.
34 Federal registration was available before 1946, but the scheme put in place by the
Lanham Act changed the dynamic in ways that the 1905 and 1920 Acts had not done. See
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edly local rights might also have been said to have been preserved through
the continued protection of common-law rights based upon use, although
since 1946 these have been effectively recognized and protected in federal
courts under federal law (as well as in theory under state law) as a result of
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The upshot is that U.S. law is nominally a
system of state-federal coexistence, but the dominance of federal jurisdiction
is such that (outside of a few areas such as protection of well-known marks or
local fame) the most crucial coexistence questions arise between national
registered rights and local, use-based rights (enforced via federal law).35
Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the United States preempt state
trademark (and unfair competition) law, as it has done with copyright and
patent.36
The European Union in some respects mimicked these different initiatives in creating the unitary EUTM effective throughout the European
Union.37 The creation of the EUTM system was part of a broader agenda of
trademark reform in Europe. Indeed, trademark reform had been part of
the work plan of the Commission from the earliest days of the European
Economic Community (in 1959, only two years after the founding, when
there were only six member states).38 The assertion of national trademark
rights potentially partitioned the European market and thus undermined
one of the essential pillars of the European project, namely, the free movement of goods within a common market.39 Indeed, even before legislative
reform was achieved, the Court of Justice had limited the circumstances in
which national trademark rights could be used to enjoin goods moving from
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Common Law and Trade Marks in an Age of Statutes, in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR DAVID VAVER 331,
335 n.19 (Catherine W. Ng et al. eds., 2010); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220
(Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
35 See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON LAW 288 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). The two principal areas
where state law has in recent years provided a different scope of relief have been dilution
protection and the protection of well-known marks. See id. at 303 (discussing state dilution); id. at 308 (discussing state law on well-known marks). The former is normatively
contested (but conceptually understandable); the latter makes less sense as a means of
implementing international obligations aimed at cross-border actors.
36 See, e.g., id. at 309; cf. Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations,
29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597 (2011).
37 See Council Regulation No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade
Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11/1) (EC).
38 See Commission Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark, ¶ 3, SEC (1976)
2462 (July 6, 1976). The first preliminary draft was prepared in 1964, although the drafts
at that time were not prepared in English. See Alexander von Mühlendahl, Unitary Character and Problems of Coexistence in the Future European Trademark System, 7 IIC 173, 174 n.2
(1976); see also Commission of the European Communities Working Paper on the Need for a European Trade Mark System, III/D/1294/794 (Oct. 1979).
39 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 34, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
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one part of the European Union to another.40 The liberalization effected by
the Court of Justice concentrated on instances when goods had been placed
on the market elsewhere in the EU by or with the consent of the mark owner
now seeking to enjoin their free distribution. Despite occasional temptations
to develop these limits,41 the court never used primary European Union law
to resolve a contest of national rights held by wholly different traders in different countries—notwithstanding the overlap of rights that occurred if their
competing goods entered the same territory, resulting in a derogation from
the principle of free movement and undermining competition.
Legislative reform (i.e., harmonization) of national trademark laws eventually came in 1988 with the EU Trade Mark Directive, the adoption of which
was motivated by the differences in the national trademark laws that might
impede free movement or distort competition within the common market.42
The Directive effected significant convergence in the substantive legal norms
applicable throughout the countries of the European Union, vastly ameliorating (though not solving entirely) the problems wrought by diverse
national trademark laws. 43 Over a quarter-century later, much of EU trademark law has become the same throughout the member states.44
But harmonization of laws did not change the fact that rights were still
acquired and enforced on a territorial basis. Thus, the trademark legislative
package also contained a counterpart Trade Mark Regulation, which created
the EUTM because of concerns about impediments to trade precipitated by
40 See, e.g., Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1184.
41 See Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Bros. v. Hag AG (Café Hag I), 1974 E.C.R. 731, 745
(creating the doctrine of “common origin”), overruled by Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v.
Hag GF AG (Café Hag II), 1990 E.C.R. I-3711.
42 See First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of Dec. 21, 1988, to Approximate the Laws
of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1990 O.J. (L 40) 1, which was replaced by
the 2008 Trade Mark Directive and later the Recast EU Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7.
43 Indeed, the process of harmonization has been taken even further by the recent
2015 reforms, which made mandatory on member states certain provisions (e.g., dilution
protection) that had been optional in the initial harmonization instrument, tackled procedural harmonization, and sought to align national law even more closely with the substantive provisions of the EU-level regime. See Recast Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7, at
recital 8 (“[I]t is necessary to go beyond the limited scope of approximation achieved by
[the first] Directive . . . and extend approximation to other aspects of substantive trade
mark law governing trade marks protected through [registration as a EUTM] . . . .”); id. at
recital 9 (“[E]ssential to approximate not only provisions of substantive law but also procedural rules. . . . [T]he principal procedural rules in the area of trade mark registration in
the Member States and in the EU trade mark system should be aligned.”). In all these
respects, the legislature was following the lead of an activist Court of Justice. See Graeme
Dinwoodie, The Europeanization of Trade Mark Law, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL METHODOLOGY 75, 81 (Ansgar Ohly &
Justine Pila eds., 2013) (discussing interpretation of the optional dilution provision, the IP
Translator decision, and “vertical” harmonization).
44 See Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 91 (“[T]rade mark law within the EU is very substantially governed by European norms.”).

R
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overlapping rights, even in an environment of harmonized laws.45 The
EUTM system, operated by the European Union Intellectual Property Office,
or EUIPO (formerly known as the Office for Harmonization in the Internal
Market, or OHIM), commenced operations in 1996.
The unitary character of the EUTM is the conceptual heart of the Regulation. Article 1(2) provides that:
An EU trade mark shall have a unitary character. It shall have equal
effect throughout the [EU]: it shall not be registered, transferred or surrendered or be the subject of a decision revoking the rights of the proprietor or
declaring it invalid, nor shall its use be prohibited, save in respect of the
whole [EU]. This principle shall apply unless otherwise provided in this
Regulation.46

That is to say, the unitary mark is valid for the entire EU or not at all.
Thus, goods bearing an EUTM can freely move throughout the EU without
fear of a conflicting national right. The unitary character of the EUTM
presents opportunities for substantial cost savings for producers within the
EU, because rights can be secured for the whole EU with a single application
to an EU-level administrative agency (the EUIPO, based in Alicante). Moreover, EU-wide relief via a single action was held out as a possibility for an
EUTM owner in the event of infringement, with these actions to be pursued
through so-called EUTM courts (though, in this instance, the Regulation
merely commandeered national courts throughout Europe to act as EUTM
courts rather than creating separate EU courts).47 Finally, as this was a unitary right, it was thought by some that use even in a single country would be
sufficient to maintain a valid, EU-wide trademark registration. (Indeed, that
was one of the principal selling points of the EUTM that was communicated
to potential applicants.48)
Unlike the Benelux antecedent, national registered rights were maintained,49 as were national rights based on use.50 That is, the European
45 EUTMR, supra note 7, at recital 4 (“The barrier of territoriality of the rights conferred on proprietors of trade marks by the laws of the Member States cannot be removed
by approximation of laws . . . .”).
46 Id. art. 1(2).
47 See id. art. 95.
48 Cf. Council and Commission Joint Statements of Dec. 20, 1993, at the Adoption of
Council Regulation No. 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11/1) (EC),
no. 10 regarding art. 15, 1996 O.J. OHIM (5/96), 613–15.
49 See EUTMR, supra note 7, at recital 6 (“The [EU] law relating to trade marks nevertheless does not replace the laws of the Member States on trade marks. It would not in fact
appear to be justified to require undertakings to apply for registration of their trade marks
as EU trade marks. National trade marks continue to be necessary for those undertakings
which do not want protection of their trade marks at Union level.”). The recitals to the
amending 2015 Regulation formally endorse the same proposition, but flesh out some of
the justifications. See ATMR, supra note 7, at recital 6 (noting the importance of national
protection for those marks that “are unable to obtain Union-wide protection while
national protection does not face any obstacles” and recognizing that “[i]t should be left to
each person seeking trade mark protection to decide whether the protection is sought only
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Union consciously embraced the coexistence of national and EU registrations, despite a twenty-year debate about whether and in what ways the structure and substance of the counterpart national and EU systems should
encourage applicants to seek EU (rather than national) registrations.51 And,
despite criticism,52 it did so far more seriously than did the United States.53
Although the substantive trademark law at the national and EU levels largely
tracked one another, traders could continue to apply for national trademark
as a national trade mark in one or more Member States, or only as an EU trade mark, or
both”).
50 See 2008 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7, at recital 5 (“This Directive should not
deprive the Member States of the right to continue to protect trade marks acquired
through use but should take them into account only in regard to the relationship between
them and trade marks acquired by registration.”); id. art. 4(4)(b) (recognizing an unregistered mark as an earlier right). Treatment of unregistered marks as earlier rights varies
throughout the member states. In many countries, registration is mandatory for a mark to
be protected under trademark law; oppositions based on unregistered marks are not
allowed unless they are well-known in the sense of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention
(even though oppositions based upon unused registered marks are allowed). Such is the
case, for example, in Spain. In those member states where unregistered signs are granted
additional protection beyond Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, the degree of such protection varies. For example, in Denmark simple prior use suffices for a mark to be protected; in Germany, Sweden, and Finland the threshold is higher and protection is granted
on the basis of qualified use (i.e., unregistered marks that enjoy a certain degree of recognition in the market); in the United Kingdom the Trade Marks Act 1994 § 5(4) protects
unregistered signs against a later registration through a notional passing-off claim, provided they enjoy a certain degree of recognition in the market (goodwill). See MAX PLANCK
INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & COMPETITION LAW, STUDY ON THE OVERALL FUNCTIONING
OF THE EUROPEAN TRADE MARK SYSTEM ¶ 2.26, at 228 (2011) [hereinafter MAX PLANCK
STUDY].
51 See, e.g., Andreas Sattler, Dilution of Well-Known Trademarks—An Analysis of Its Foundations in Germany and the European Union, 3 GERMAN INTELL. PROP. J. 304, 320 (2011).
52 See Hugh Laddie, National I.P. Rights: A Moribund Anachronism in a Federal Europe?, 23
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 402, 408 (2001) (“I.P. rights were created to encourage the growth
of our domestic economy. Now that we are in a single market, our domestic economy is
[EU]-wide. So should our I.P. rights be. At the moment they are not. As I have noted
already, even now proposals for new I.P. laws fail to take on board the necessity of phasing
out these relics of the past. [EU]-wide rights should be a replacement for national rights,
not a supplement to them. I can only hope that the [EU] trade mark will prove such a
success that users will vote with their feet and will use it to the exclusion of national
rights.”).
53 This shows in other ways too. In working out the scope of prior national rights that
might limit EUTM rights, EU law defers in large part to national law. See, e.g., Case C-196/
11P, Formula One Licensing BV v. OHIM, 2012 E.C.R. 1. In contrast, in the United States,
a state registration cannot be regarded as conferring priority throughout a state, even
though that might be a closer proxy for actual markets and even though as a rule the
consequences of state registration mirror those found at the federal level, because the
geographic scope of rights available under federal law would preempt those conferred by
state law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. e (1995) (noting
the preemption argument); see also Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279,
1284 (4th Cir. 1987) (explaining that when conflicts arise between federal and state law
involving state registration statutes, the Lanham Act preempts state law).
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rights and, in fact, still do so.54 And unlike the United States, where federal
courts have assumed complete dominance, day-to-day enforcement of rights
(both of national and EUTM rights) occurs at the national level. To be sure,
EUTMs are enforced by courts designated as “EUTM courts” with jurisdiction
that can (depending upon venue rules in the Regulation) extend across the
entire federal territory of the EU. But these EUTM courts are national courts
designated as such by member states. Typically, member states have designated the same courts who hear national trademark cases. Thus both
national and EUTM matters are heard in locally-based courts, sometimes
wearing federal hats. The only truly EU institutions involved in determination of EU trademark law are the Court of Justice (which hears appeals on
points of law from national and EUTM courts) and the EUIPO (which adjudicates registration disputes from administrative decisions, and from which
there are appeals to the General Court and from there to the Court of
Justice).55
This is not to say that the trademark package lacked features designed to
encourage a switch to EUTM applications over national applications.
Indeed, this is implicit in the stated justifications for the EUTM scheme,
namely, to create “legal conditions . . . which enable undertakings to adapt
their activities to the scale of the [EU], whether in manufacturing and distributing goods or in providing services.”56 For example, holders of a portfolio of older national registrations could, upon securing an EUTM
registration, allow their counterpart national registrations to lapse, and
through a new device called “seniority” (claimed on filing the EUTM or
thereafter) maintain the earlier national rights as “shadow” rights without the
need to register.57 Presumably, this preserved the disparate (pre-1996) priority dates of the earlier national registrations, though the success of such
seniority claims has never really been tested in the courts, in part because for
a lengthy period of time many trademark owners would not allow their
national registrations to lapse and renewed both national and EUTM
registrations.58
54 See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, at 255 (“[A] majority of [EUTM] proprietors
as well as [EUTM] agents, i.e. 41 percent of proprietors and 59 percent of agents, are using
the national systems and file national trade marks, either simultaneously with [EUTM]s or
only on the national level.”).
55 In 2015, 36% (302 out of 831) of all cases brought before and 39% (388 out of 987)
of all cases decided by the General Court of the European Union were trademark cases.
Yet, no trademark specialists are appointed to the court. See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 29–30 (2016), http://curia
.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-10/qdaq16001enn.pdf.
56 EUTMR, supra note 7, at recital 2; see also id. at recital 4 (“In order to open up
unrestricted economic activity in the whole of the internal market for the benefit of undertakings, trade marks should be created which are governed by a uniform Union law
directly applicable in all Member States.”).
57 See id. arts. 34–35.
58 The filing data offers no definitive answers. The renewal rate for national U.K.
trademarks has remained very stable throughout the period 2000–2014, and indeed has
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But the more significant long-term switch to the EUTM scheme
occurred with respect to new applications.59 As the number of EUTM registrations has risen dramatically since the entry into force of the CTMR, 60
the number of national applications filed before the national trademark
offices of the member states has fallen. 61 However, there have been excepseen a slight increase over the years, i.e., from 38.5% in 2000 to 46.8% in 2014. Interestingly, the renewal rate for EUTMs has decreased over the last decade, going from approximately 71% in 2006 to approximately 55% in 2015. See EUROPEAN UNION INTELLECTUAL
PROP. OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 22–31 (2015), https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnelweb/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/News/euipo-annual-report-2015_en.pdf;
U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, FACTS AND FIGURES: PATENT, TRADE MARK, DESIGN &
HEARING ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 2013 AND 2014 CALENDAR YEARS 41 (2015), https://www
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/456097/Facts_and_
Figures_2015.pdf; GEORG VON GRAEVENITZ ET AL., U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, CLUTTERING AND NON-USE OF TRADE MARKS IN EUROPE 10 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/568675/TM_cluttering_report.pdf.
59 See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 1.22, at 9.
60 There were 43,000 EUTM applications in 1996, which increased to almost 128,000
by 2015. Registrations of EUTMs originating in the member states have constantly
increased. See EUROPEAN UNION INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, FACTS & FIGURES 2015, at
6–11 (2015), https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_li
brary/contentPdfs/about_euipo/annual_report/facts_and_figures_2015_en.pdf; WIPO IP
Statistics Data Center, WIPO, http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/keyindex.htm (last updated
Feb. 2017) [hereinafter WIPO’s Data Center]. For charts and graphs extracted using
WIPO’s statistical tool, as well as the EUIPO’s graph showing the top ten EUTM-filing
countries for the period 1996–2015, see infra Annex.
61 Although the evidence across the EU is mixed, data shows that the adoption of the
EUTM system has had a considerable impact on the number of trademark applications
being filed before the national trademark offices. For instance, the Spanish PTO received
77,139 applications in 1995, falling to 63,292 by 2004 and to 53,103 by 2015; the Benelux
trademark office received 37,262, 31,124, and 24,608 applications in 1995, 2004, and 2015,
respectively; and the Austrian trademark office received 19,793, 16,617, and 8117 applications in 1995, 2004, and 2015, respectively. See infra Annex. This trend is true not only of
those countries that were member states to the EU at the time of entry into force of the
CTMR (1996), but also of those countries that have joined the EU since then (with the
decrease in the number of applications taking place from the date of accession). See infra
Annex. For instance, among countries that entered the Union in 2004, the Czech trademark office received 18,227 applications in 2003, falling to 12,667 by 2008, and to 9971 by
2015; the Polish office received 24,133, 20,127, and 15,452 applications in 2003, 2008, and
2015, respectively; and the Hungarian office received 13,564, 7491, and 4852 applications
in 2003, 2008, and 2015, respectively. See infra Annex. This trend was also noted in the
Max Planck Study. See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 1.20, at 8 (“The absolute
majority of national offices’ replies indicate that the number of trade mark applications
received by the national offices has decreased during [2006–2011].”); id. ¶ 1.22, at 9
(reporting the comment of the Benelux trademark office that “[t]he [EU] trade mark has
undeniably had an (negative) impact on the number of Benelux applications (as it has
doubtlessly had for all national applications)”); id. ¶ 1.22, at 10 (“[T]he figures tend to
suggest that an imbalance is emerging and becoming increasingly marked with each passing year. If the changing numbers of applications to the BOIP and to the [EUIPO] over
the last few years are observed side by side, it is impossible not to note that the Benelux
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tions to this trend, most notably, in the United Kingdom, Germany, and
France.62
This practice was encouraged by a variety of devices, including the fee
structure at the EUIPO, the liberal attitude of the EUIPO towards specification of goods and services, and the lack of any “intent to use” requirement as
a precondition to filing for an EUTM. 63 To be sure, securing an EUTM
would require an applicant to navigate around earlier rights anywhere in
Europe and to avoid a rejection on an absolute ground (e.g., lack of distinctiveness) that applied even in just a part of the European Union.64 But any
concerns that this might repress applications for the EUTM because it might
be harder to obtain were addressed by including in the Regulation a conversion procedure; this would allow an EUTM applicant who encountered an
insurmountable problem at the EU level to refile for national registrations in
countries where the impediment did not exist, and (if successful) to maintain
the priority date of the original EUTM filing.65 And, perhaps most notably,
an EUTM conferred EU-wide rights, maintainable (it was thought) by genuine use in any one EU country after the expiration of the five-year grace
period, and enforceable in a single proceeding in a court with jurisdiction to
grant EU-wide relief. 66
applications have been falling almost constantly . . . while the [EU] applications have been
rising almost without interruption.”).
62 The three largest economies of the EU (Germany, the United Kingdom, and
France) have seen an increase in the number of applications filed before their respective
national trademark offices. For example, the French trademark office received 81,694
applications in 1995, decreasing slightly to 74,696 by 2003 and increasing once again to
reach 94,898 in 2015. In the case of the United Kingdom, the Intellectual Property Office
(IPO or UKIPO) received 36,743 applications in 1995, remaining stable through 2003 at
36,192 applications, and increasing thereafter to 57,869 in 2015. See infra Annex. This
could be explained by changes in trademark filing strategies by applicants. See MAX
PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 1.22, at 9 (reporting the comment of the U.K. Intellectual
Property Office that “the ‘gap’ caused by fewer registrations from bigger companies is filled by an increased number of applications from SMEs, which only apply for domestic
registration. That big enterprises register less domestically is indicated by the fact that
nowadays 50–60 percent of the applicants are personal owners, whereas five years ago the
majority of the applications came from attorneys. The reason might be that the enterprises in the time of online trading prefer acting across the [EU]”). The decision of the
United Kingdom to leave the European Union has caused a sudden surge of national
applications by foreign traders. Twitter, for example, has just refiled all its EUTMs as U.K.
national trademarks. In August 2016, there was a 33% increase in the number of national
filings with the U.K. office over the same month in 2015. See FOI RELEASE: INFORMATION
RELEASED UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: FILING TRENDS POST-EU REFERENDUM
VOTE (2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/565467/ipo-foi-2016-492-filing-trends-post-eu-referendum.pdf.
63 See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50.
64 See EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 7(2) (providing for assessment of absolute grounds);
id. art. 8(2) (recognizing earlier rights for purposes of EUTM applications).
65 See id. arts. 112–14.
66 See infra text accompanying notes 138–52.
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The EUTM initiative has been a huge success, and the EUIPO now registers in excess of 100,000 marks per year.67 And it is increasingly seen as the
model for initiatives elsewhere. In 1978, then-U.S. Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks Sidney Diamond, when asked to speculate as to the state of
trademark law a hundred years hence, predicted that there would by then be
a “supranational world trademark . . . system . . . [with a single] registration
with worldwide effect.”68 And, in light of the success of the EUTM, Professor
Ruth Annand and Leone Kemp have suggested that the EUTM “provides a
model for a world trade mark system.”69
Global replication of the EUTM is surely some time off. 70 But it has
already been imitated regionally. Unitary systems similar to the EUTM have
been adopted or are being considered by three members of the Russian
Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan);71
by Australia and New Zealand, who would create a trans-Tasman mark;72 by
two groupings of African countries (one English-speaking, one French-speaking); and perhaps most intriguingly across a group of Portuguese-speaking
countries who are presently considering a so-called Lusophone mark.73
67 In 1997 (the first full year of operation), the office received approximately 30,000
applications for EUTMs; in 2015, the number of applications was in excess of 125,000, with
over 100,000 registrations issued. This data was obtained from WIPO’s Data Center, see
supra note 60; see also infra Annex.
68 Sidney A. Diamond, The Next 100 Years—What Will It Be Like in 2078 AD?, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 622, 630 (1978).
69 See Ruth Annand & Leone Kemp, Global Registration—Where Are We Now?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 94, 97 (2011).
70 Annand & Kemp were skeptical that the underlying political and social drivers for
such a development would be in place for some time. Id. I am too.
71 See Draft Agreement on Unitary Trademark Within Customs Union of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Russia art. 12, Dec. 20, 2012, http://tsouz.ru/db/ip/Pages/pd.aspx (follow first hyperlink). See generally Ignacio Lazaro, Draft Agreement on Unitary Trademark
Within Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, PETOŠEVIĆ (Jan. 31, 2013), http://
www.petosevic.com/resources/news/2013/01/001071 (“The goal of the draft agreement
is to create a ‘SES trademark’, which would coexist with national rights in a similar way
[EUTM]s coexist with national rights in the EU.”). See also ASEAN Framework Agreement
on Intellectual Property Cooperation art. 1(5), Dec. 15, 1995, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
lexdocs/treaties/en/asean-ip/trt_asean_ip.pdf (“Member States shall explore the possibility of setting up of an ASEAN trademark system, including an ASEAN Trademark Office, if
feasible, to promote the region-wide protection of trademark bearing in mind developments on regional and international protection of trademarks.”).
72 See Paul Sumpter, Some Observations on Trans-Tasman Trade Mark Law, 27 AUSTL.
INTELL. PROP. J. 88 (2016) (noting limited steps towards this goal).
73 See Pedro Malaquias, Lusophone Trade Mark: First the CTM, Then the SES and Now the
LTM?, MARQUES (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.marques.org/class46/Default.asp?XID=
BHA3126. This development is especially intriguing because it raises the question about
the primary driver of unitary rights: political alliances, geographic proximity, or cultural
and linguistic commonality. Indeed, African countries participating in groupings for
trademark law purposes have long been organized between French- or English-speaking
nations. And indeed, more broadly, the connection between language and territory is an
under-appreciated aspect of this discussion.
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These reform initiatives, breaking down the national borders that in part
defined the metes and bounds of (especially registered) trademark rights,
reflect some of the broader pressures that have been heaped on the principle
of territoriality by global trade and digital communication technologies. No
doubt they have also been spurred by the apparent success of the EUTM, and
of the EUIPO as a leader in international trademark policy debates (and an
increasingly autonomous voice before the Court of Justice).74
But the success of the EU initiative, while surely facilitating the free
movement of goods around the European market, has arguably generated
other costs. In particular, despite one motivation for the EUTM being to
reduce the incidence of overlapping marks, an unadulterated version of the
unitary rights system may in fact increase overlaps. This is because liberallyconferred EU-wide rights can contribute to the problem of trademark clutter, and their default EU-wide enforcement ignores the historical (and theoretical) proposition that trademarks have an intrinsic spatiality (defined by
the territory in which they are used and known) that needs to be balanced
against the territorial scope emanating from the authority of the political
institutions that registered the mark in question.75
III. INCREASED OVERLAP

IN

MARKS: CLUTTER

In recent years, commentators and policymakers (and some traders)
have expressed concern that registers around the world are increasingly cluttered, making it harder and more expensive to clear trademark rights. Such
concerns were a central part of the Study on the Overall Functioning of the European Trade Mark System (“Max Planck Study” or “Study”), conducted by the
Max Planck Institute in 2011, which formed the basis for the 2015 reform of
EU trademark law.76 Although the Max Planck Study revealed divergent
views on the scale of the problem, and the clutter-related reforms implemented some (but not all) of the policy options canvassed or recommended
in the Study, the concerns have remained. This has been particularly so in
the United Kingdom, and the U.K. Intellectual Property Office has commissioned further academic work since the Max Planck Study to explore the
problem.77 Scholars in the United States, moreover, have begun to question
empirically whether the assumption of a finite supply of word marks is wellfounded.78 Although this scholarship has not yet provoked dramatic
changes, recent administrative reforms in the United States designed to
74 See About TM5, TM5: FIVE TRADEMARK OFFICES, http://tmfive.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2017); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 90 (discussing the political economy of the office’s role in the development of European trademark law).
75 See Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 888 (defining “intrinsic” and “political”
territoriality).
76 MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50.
77 See, e.g., VON GRAEVENITZ ET AL., supra note 58; GEORG VON GRAEVENITZ ET AL., U.K.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, TRADE MARK CLUTTERING: AN EXPLORATORY REPORT (2012),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710618.
78 See Beebe & Fromer, supra note 8.
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ensure that marks are being used on all the goods recited in a registration
are arguably motivated in part by similar concerns.79 In any event, while the
extent of the problem and desired solutions may be a matter of debate,
avoiding so-called deadwood (marks that are never used) is clearly a normative concern in any registration scheme.80
The extent of overlaps among competing mark owners, and the clutter
that arises, is affected by a number of variables, including both the number
of marks and the scope of protection conferred by trademark law on each
mark. The number of marks on registers has increased substantially in many
countries in recent years;81 indeed, even with over one million active EUTM
registrations,82 there has been a recent resurgence of national registrations
in some EU countries.83 Some of the rise in registration volume has been
the result of increased use of registration, as a result of procedural liberalization. For example, in the United States, the adoption of an “intent to use”
registration in 1988 encouraged early filing of trademark applications, and
the policing of the requirement has for the most part been light.84 And the
EUTM system introduced in 1996 lacked any “intent to use” requirement
prior to full registration.85 Growth in registerable subject matter has possibly
also contributed, though nontraditional marks remain a small percentage of
79 A United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) study released in June 2014
suggested that in nearly half of five hundred randomly-selected registrations, the registrant
failed to meet the USPTO’s request to verify the previously claimed use on particular
goods and/or services. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POST REGISTRATION PROOF OF
USE PILOT STATUS REPORT (2014), www.uspto.gov/trademarks/notices/Post_Registration_
Proof_of_Use.doc. Thus, the USPTO has recently revised its regulations to authorize the
office to request information verifying the accuracy of claims that a mark is in use in connection with specified goods or services. See Changes in Requirements for Affidavits or
Declarations of Use, Continued Use, or Excusable Nonuse in Trademark Cases, 82 Fed.
Reg. 6259 (Jan. 19, 2017).
80 See 2008 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7, at recital 9 (“In order to reduce the
total number of trade marks registered and protected in the [Union] and, consequently,
the number of conflicts which arise between them, it is essential to require that registered
trade marks must actually be used or, if not used, be subject to revocation.”); see also Recast
EU Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7, at recital 31.
81 For instance, the UKIPO has gone from 390,747 registrations in force in 2004 to
589,559 in 2015; the German Trademark Office has gone from 716,123 to 936,356, and the
Benelux office from 573,352 to 624,735, both during the same period. This data was
obtained from WIPO’s Data Center, see supra note 60; infra Annex.
82 In 2014, the number of EUTMs in force at the EUIPO amounted to 1,029,837. This
data was obtained from WIPO’s Data Center, see supra note 60; infra Annex.
83 See supra text accompanying notes 61–62 (discussing the German, U.K., and French
experiences).
84 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2012); Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100667, 102 Stat. 3935.
85 See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 2.94, at 86; cf. Case C-529/07, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v. Franz Hauswirth GmbH, 2009 E.C.R. I-4893, I-4932
(suggesting a possible bad faith objection “when it becomes apparent, subsequently, that
the applicant applied for registration of a sign as [an EU] trade mark without intending to
use it, his sole objective being to prevent a third party from entering the market”).
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registrations in any jurisdiction (despite the intense attention paid to them in
the scholarly literature and in litigation).86 And in any event, more substantial hurdles to registration of product shape (and some other nontraditional
marks) have arisen in both the United States and the European Union in the
last couple of years, whether by requiring stricter proof of acquired distinctiveness, offering robust applications of the functionality exclusion87 or (in
the EU) strictly enforcing the “graphic representation” and “sign” requirements.88 The integrity of the register has also not been helped by the outsourcing of relative grounds analysis to opposition proceedings;89 as a result,
in many countries (most notably in Europe) potentially conflicting marks
remain on the register until challenged by those with competing private
interests.
The number of marks on the register has also been affected by developments in international trademark law. In particular, the expansion of the
86 From 1996 through November 2016, the EUIPO received only 11,933 applications
to register nontraditional marks (i.e., nonword or nonfigurative marks, such as shape,
color, sound, hologram, and olfactory marks) out of 1,616,558 applications, amounting to
0.74% of the total number of applications. This is even lower in the case of registrations,
with 6557 nontraditional marks registered out of 1,305,634, amounting to 0.5% of the total
number of registrations. See EUROPEAN UNION INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, STATISTICS OF
EUROPEAN UNION TRADE MARKS (2017) (reporting figures as of Jan. 5, 2017).
87 See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Case C205/13, Hauck GmbH v. Stokke, EU:C:2014:2233. This exclusion has also just undergone
a legislative broadening in the EU. See ATMR, supra note 7, art. 1(9) (amending EUTMR
Article 7 by extending exclusion beyond “product shape” to “other characteristics”).
88 See Case C-321/03, Dyson Ltd v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2007 E.C.R. I-687 (vacuum cleaner bin); Case 273/00, Sieckmann, 2002 E.C.R. I-11737; J.W. Spear & Son Ltd. v.
Zynga Inc. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1175 (Eng.). The 2015 reforms deleted the “graphic representation” requirement from the definition of trademark and reduced it to an administrative requirement to be addressed by offices. See ATMR, supra note 7, art. 1(8); MAX PLANCK
STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 2.12, at 67 (“[I]t should be made clear that, as important as graphical representation may be, it is only of relevance in the framework of the registration system and does not determine the protectability of marks as such.”). But this will barely
affect the number of marks capable of being registered; it may simply make the mechanics
of registration easier in a few cases.
89 See The Trade Marks (Relative Grounds) Order 2007, SI 2007/1976 (Eng.) (amending U.K. law); OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MKT., DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR
EXAMINATION IN THE OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (TRADE MARKS
AND DESIGNS) ON COMMUNITY TRADE MARKS, pt. C, § 0.1 (2016), https://euipo.europa.eu/
tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/trade_marks/Draft_
Guidelines_WP_1_2016/06_part%20_c_opposition_section_0_editors_note_and_general_
introduction_clean_2016_en.pdf (limiting ex officio examination to absolute grounds).
The International Trademark Association (INTA) argued in the recent reform debates in
Europe that member states should be precluded from examining for relative grounds; fortunately, this proposal was not adopted in the final legislation. In the United States, the
office will examine for conflicting earlier federal registrations. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1207.03 (2015) [hereinafter
TMEP], http:// www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmep (indicating that the PTO will not at
the ex parte stage of examination refuse registration on the basis of an unregistered mark
or trade name, jointly referred to as “known marks”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL409.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 21

territorial overlaps in trademark law

11-MAY-17

9:02

1689

reach of the Madrid Protocol to significant jurisdictions such as the United
States, Japan, and the European Union over the last fifteen years (and the
addition of Spanish as a working language of the Madrid system) has led to
the same marks being registered in a greater number of countries.90 The
Madrid Union now covers 114 countries representing more than eighty percent of world trade. 91 Indeed, even without the greater use of the Madrid
mechanism, one would have expected liberalization of trade (and online
commerce) to cause producers to register their marks in a greater number of
countries reflecting the broader distribution of goods and services.
The international dimension to this question has, however, affected
more than numbers of registered marks. Clutter is also a function of the size
of the footprint that a mark occupies on any given register; that is to say,
clutter is also affected by the scope of marks, meaning the range of uses by
competing traders that can be restrained by assertion of the senior mark.
Trademark scope in turn is determined by a number of intersecting variables: at a very general level, the metes and bounds of a mark are defined by
the “sign” or “symbol” embodying the mark, the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used or registered, and the breadth of rights
accorded by trademark law. At a more granular level, the scope of a mark
will be affected by matters such as the method that courts use to define rights
(such as whether to allow a mark to evolve beyond its registered exemplar),
and how faithfully those definitions are adhered to in assessing infringement.92 But the basic variables are clear.
In recent years, treatment of some of these variables by offices and
courts has contributed to an expansion in scope. Arguably, some trademark
offices have adopted more liberal attitudes towards the identification of
90 The number of international applications filed through the Madrid system reached
the historic figure of 47,885 in 2014. There has been an almost constant increase in the
number of applications filed using the Madrid system during the last eighteen years
(exceptions coinciding with economic recessions), going from 19,071 applications in 1997,
to 29,472 in 2004 and 39,687 in 2010. The number of international registrations in 2014
amounted to 42,430, with 292,598 designations in total. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ORG., MADRID YEARLY REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS (2015), http://www
.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_940_2015.pdf; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
MADRID SYSTEM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS: REPORT FOR 2011 (2011),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/940/wipo_pub_940_2011.pdf. This is
likely to be particularly significant in registration-based countries. But one can see similar
trends in the United States. Applications via the Madrid system designating the USPTO
have almost doubled since it joined in 2004, going from 9070 in that year to 19,248 in
2015. (This data was obtained from WIPO’s Data Center, see supra note 60). A foreign
applicant filing in the United States under these provisions can secure a registration without having used its mark in the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 1141h(a)(3) (2012).
91 See Members of the Madrid Union, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/members/
(last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
92 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Dev S. Gangjee, The Image of the Consumer in European
Trade Mark Law, in THE IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN EU LAW 339, 357–60 (Dorota
Leczykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2016); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197 (2016).
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goods and services on a registration, a requirement that classically was used
by U.S. agencies to limit problems of clutter, and an issue on which the Court
of Justice of the European Union recently found the overly-generous
approach of the EUIPO wanting.93 Certainly, there has been some stiffening
of standards in both the United States and the European Union over the last
year.94 But the significance of any retrenchment on that front might be trivial given changes in substantive law. In particular, judicial acceptance of
actionable confusion has expanded to contexts where goods are less closely
related than was formerly required and to diverse forms of confusion. 95 And
legislative endorsement of dilution protection against uses on dissimilar
goods may render finely-grained articulations of the goods and services in a
specification rather beside the point. 96
But scope also has a territorial dimension. 97 The metes and bounds of a
mark are defined by the territory for which protection exists as well as by
reference to the sign and the goods or services in connection with which the
mark is used. In use-based systems (such as the common-law form of protection in the United States), that territorial dimension historically depended
on the area in which a mark was used, although the concept of “use”
expanded over time to encompass areas where a trader’s reputation has
extended or to which a trader would typically expand its activities.98 In regis93 See Case C-307/10, Chartered Inst. of Patent Attorneys v. Registrar of Trade Marks
(IP Translator), EU:C:2011:784; see also VON GRAEVENITZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 2
(“[M]arks registered at [EUIPO] contain claims to 50% more goods and/or services than
the identical marks registered at USPTO.”).
94 See ATMR, supra note 7, art. 1(28) (implementing the IP Translator decision); supra
text accompanying note 79 (discussing the USPTO pilot project); see also Dinwoodie, supra
note 22, at 31 (discussing the tightening of judicial scrutiny of “definition of trade dress”
claims).
95 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413
(2010); William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 253 (2013). Courts in Europe are perhaps stricter in their insistence on confusion
(arguably because of the existence of double-identity actions and dilution claims that are
easier to advance than in the United States), but even in Europe there are indications that
courts might be open to broader notions of actionable confusion. See, e.g., DataCard Corp.
v. Eagle Techs. Ltd. [2011] EWHC (Pat) 244 [276]–[289] (Eng.); Och-Ziff Mgmt. Eur. Ltd.
v. OCH Capital LLP [2010] EWHC (Ch) 2599 (Eng.); cf. Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer
PLC [2014] EWCA (Civ) 1403 (Eng.).
96 Cf. DataCard, [2011] EWHC (Pat) 244 at [291] (“[R]eputation . . . is not a particularly onerous requirement.”).
97 Courts can—and have—limited some problems by adopting a more restrained definition of when—and where—a third party has “used” a mark. This restraint has been
particularly important in the Internet context where any other approach would have magnified the number of territorial overlaps and allowed competing national mark owners in
different countries effectively to block expansion of each other onto an online platform.
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of Trademarks 27
(World Intellectual Prop. Org. Document, No. WIPO/PIL/01/4 2001) (WIPO Forum on
Private International Law and Intellectual Property, January 30–31, 2001) (discussing
“mutual blocking” capacity).
98 See Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 899.
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tration systems, the relevant territory is that of the political unit granting the
registration; in the case of a U.K. registration, that would be the national
territory, but in the case of the unitary EUTM that would be the territory of
the entire EU.99 At present, that territory encompasses twenty-eight nations
and five hundred million people. Thus, it is clear that an EUTM registration
occupies a sizeable space on trademark registers. An EUTM will operate not
only to block competing EUTM registrations, but also any application for a
national registration in any member state of the European Union.100 To be
sure, under the principle of national-EU coexistence, a U.K. national registration will likewise preclude the registration of a later conflicting mark on
the EUTM register.101 But a U.K. mark will not preclude a national registration in any of the other twenty-seven member states of the European Union.
Indeed, if an applicant for an EUTM is stymied by an earlier conflicting U.K.
registration, it can convert its application to national applications without
losing the original EUTM filing date.102
Thus, a switch by trademark applicants in Europe from national registrations to an EUTM is likely to exacerbate clutter (even if the mark owner
would have filed for more than one national registration). And the linking
of the EUTM with the increasingly-popular Madrid Protocol in 2004 made it
even easier for applicants beyond the European Union to combine a numerical and geographic accelerator in a single application. 103 If clutter is a concern, the move to unitary rights in Europe, across such a vast territory, needs
to be carefully assessed.
IV. COMMITMENTS

UNITARY CHARACTER
THE COURT OF JUSTICE

TO THE

OF THE

EUTM:

However, one should not lose sight of why unitary marks were introduced in the EU in the first place. The very point of the concept was to
accord a mark owner rights over a more extensive territory, both to facilitate
existing cross-border trade and to encourage further expansion of trade.
And the unitary right would allow traders to do that without fear of conflict99 Strictly, one could extend the territorial reach of a registration to encompass conduct that occurs beyond the borders but against which a court might apply its trademark
law extraterritorially. See, e.g., ATMR, supra note 7, art. 1(11)(4) (adding EUTMR art. 9(4)
and allowing for in-transit seizures of goods passing through a free trade area bearing
identical marks to those registered as an EUTM); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d
733 (2d Cir. 1994).
100 See 2008 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(2)(a)(i) (defining “earlier mark”
for purposes of assessing applications for registrations under national law to include earlier
EUTMs).
101 See EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 8(2)(a)(ii) (defining “earlier mark” for purposes of
assessing applications for registrations of EUTMs to include earlier national registrations).
102 See id. art. 112.
103 Council Decision 2003/793 of Oct. 27, 2003, Approving the Accession of the European Community to the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Adopted at Madrid on June 27, 1989, 2003 O.J. (L 296/20)
(EC).
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ing rights in particular locales, and would allow them to acquire those rights
at a lower cost. In sum, this development would foster regional competition,
enhance consumer choice, and reduce transaction costs. 104 So it is important to pinpoint precisely the circumstances in which the benefits of the unitary right might be outweighed by the costs.
Registration allows a mark owner to occupy space on the register in
excess of the reach of its trading, whether because a registration defines the
trademark right (as in the European Union) or because registration is
treated as constructive nationwide use (as in the United States). And that
gap between the trading reality and the reach of the right can be substantial
in “pure” registration-based systems that permit registration without use (and
in the case of the EUTM, permit applications without even an intent to use).
Such a register inevitably contains a larger proportion of so-called “deadwood.” These unused marks are, as was memorably described by Mr. Justice
Jacob (as he then was) in Laboratoires Goemar SA’s Trade Mark (No.1), “abandoned vessels in the shipping lanes of trade.”105 They create transaction
costs for traders and reduce market efficiency.106
This is true both in single country registers and in unitary systems transcending borders. But the denominator—as it were—in the “extent-of-trade
to reach-of-right” ratio gets greater the larger the territorial scope of registrations, and shifts to unitary systems effect an expansion of that nature. (They
do so in varying degrees; the unitary Benelux territory is still smaller than the
national U.S. territory). The cost of clutter is most severe when the gap
between actual (and desirable) use and the scope of exclusive rights conferred by the register is greatest. This assessment turns on: (1) the size of the
political unit of registration; (2) the scope of the actual market use; and (3)
the level of actual or possible (or desired) market integration within the
political unit, which rests on any number of social or market features that
would retard or expedite that integration.
For example, conferring exclusive rights throughout the densely populated and relatively homogenous islands of Malta (population 423,000) for a
use on nonfungible goods that presently extends across the northern ninety
104 Cf. MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 1.35, at 53–54 (arguing that the features of
the EU system that produce greater deadwood than would be found in the United States
register “should . . . not be regarded in isolation, but must be appraised as an element
forming part of a system which is more strongly geared towards fast and cost-efficient procedures than its American counterpart[,] [and thus changes to these features of registration] are only called for if the obstacles to access resulting from unused or unnecessary
registrations are substantial in their dimensions, and if the solutions envisaged are feasible
and appropriate under a cost-benefits perspective”).
105 Laboratoires Goemar SA’s Trade Mark (No. 1), [2002] F.S.R. 51, [19] (Ch) (Eng.)
(Jacob, J.).
106 See Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 898 n.44 (2004) (noting that the clutter problem
may undermine the purpose of the registration scheme, which is to enable and encourage
economic expansion into broader geographic markets without competing trademark
rights becoming a barrier to such commerce).
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percent of the country risks very little deadwood cost. 107 In contrast, conferring exclusive rights throughout Germany (population eighty million)108 for
a use of a mark on a local service offered in a rural village on the southern
border seems potentially in excess of the potential benefits of registration.
As explained below, many iterations of these variables look complex when
transferred to the context of a European Union consisting of twenty-eight
member states, speaking twenty-three languages,109 and encompassing communities with widely different commercial and social norms. Despite calls for
an ever-closer union, EU law—including trademark law—recognizes the
value of the cultural, linguistic, and social diversity that exists throughout
Europe, and that those variations are informed by (and should in turn
inform) the structure of the market.
Different mechanisms might balance the territorial expansion of trade
that the unitary EUTM seeks to further with the costs of clutter and the concerns of diversity. These questions are assessed briefly in Part VI of this Article. However, it is worth establishing first the extent to which the courts have
thus far embraced the unitary principle. Too warm an embrace might
prompt concern for whether a desirable balance has been found, and suggest
the need for more aggressive interventions; a more measured approach
might reassure us that the courts are capable of taking account of these competing values and avoiding unnecessary overlaps.
The concept of a “unitary” right has been tested before the Court of
Justice in four principal doctrinal settings: (1) when a mark owner seeks to
demonstrate acquired distinctiveness throughout Europe; (2) in assessing
whether a trademark owner has made genuine use sufficient to maintain EUwide rights; (3) in determining whether to grant relief on an EU-wide basis;
and relatedly, (4) when the owner of a mark with “a reputation in the [EU]”
wishes to avail itself of dilution protection in a locale where it has no
reputation.110
In this Article, I focus on the approach of courts to the questions of
genuine use and scope of relief. Judicial assessment of issues relating to
acquired distinctiveness and reputation will be addressed within my discussion of these two dominant questions.111
107 WIL JAMES, CIVITAS INST. FOR THE STUDY OF CIVIL SOC’Y, CYPRUS (KÝPROS) AND
MALTA (2015), http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/MS.12.Cyprus-and-Malta.pdf.
108 Press Release, Destatis Staistisches Bundesamt, Population at 82.2 Million at the End
of 2015—Population Increase Due to High Immigration (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www
.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_295_12411.html.
109 EU Member Countries in Brief, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en (last visited Mar. 12, 2017); Working
Languages of the European Parliament, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN PLAIN LANGUAGE, http://
europarlamentti.info/en/European-parliament/working-languages/ (last visited Mar. 12,
2017).
110 EUTMR, supra note 7, arts. 8(5), 9(1)(c).
111 The treatment of those two issues in EU law also bears on the questions of how
methodologically one implements a particular vision of the European project, such as how
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Genuine Use

In a registration system, the requirement that a mark (at some point in
time) be used is a crucial component in any attack on clutter. This is true
even in pure registration systems such as the EUTM; indeed, because no use
(or intent to use) is required to secure a registration, policing of use necessary to maintain rights is especially important. Thus, Article 15 of the
EUTMR provides that “[i]f, within a period of five years following registration, the proprietor has not put the EU trade mark to genuine use in the
Union . . . the EU Trade Mark shall be subject to [an action for revocation].”112 A parallel five-year grace period exists under the Directive; thus
national marks must be put to genuine use in the member state in question
within five years of their registration.113
In a number of cases interpreting the provision, the Court of Justice has
set a relatively undemanding—and vague—standard for what constitutes
“genuine use.”114 Of course, genuine use does not include token use for the
sole purpose of preserving rights. But to maintain rights, the court has said
simply that the mark has to be “used in accordance with its essential function,
which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for
which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods
or services.”115 The guidance offered by the court as to how to assess that
standard in practice is hardly prescriptive:
to operationalize the existence of a European consumer. See infra text accompanying
notes 210–20.
112 EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 15; see also EUTMR, supra note 7, at recital 10 (“There is
no justification for protecting EU trade marks or, as against them, any trade mark which
has been registered before them, except where the trade marks are actually used.”). Such
a revocation proceeding—though it obviously should be far more important than its U.S.
counterpart because the European Union lacks a use precondition to registration—is triggered only after five years, a period that exceeds the three years of non-use that typically
supports a cancellation petition in the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “abandoned”). And the pruning of the register depends largely upon private actions
(after five years) or mark-owner failure to renew the registration (after ten years). Indeed,
if an owner resumes use after the five-year period but before any revocation action is filed,
the registration will be preserved. See 2008 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7, art. 12(1);
EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 51(1)(a). That is to say, the European system offers lesser
administrative oversight through maintenance obligations, such as filing affidavits of use,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2012), even though a recent report of the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office attributed the vastly greater range of goods and services found in
European specifications to the fact that the USPTO requires firms to prove use of marks
after six and ten years of registration. See VON GRAEVENITZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 2
(“[M]arks registered at [EUIPO] contain claims to 50% more goods and/or services than
the identical marks registered at USPTO . . . because USPTO require firms to prove use of
marks after 6 and 10 years of registration.”).
113 See 2008 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7, arts. 10–11.
114 See, e.g., Case C-251/95, Ansul BV v. Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV, 2003 E.C.R. I-2439.
115 Case C-259/02, La Mer Tech. Inc. v. Labs. Goëmar SA, 2004 E.C.R. I-1159, ¶ 27; see
also Case C-416/04 P, Sunrider Corp. v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-4237, ¶ 70.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL409.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 27

territorial overlaps in trademark law

11-MAY-17

9:02

1695

[R]egard must be had to . . . whether such use is viewed as warranted in the
economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for
the goods or services protected by the mark. . . , the nature of the goods or
service at issue, the characteristics of the market concerned and the scale
and frequency of use of the mark.116

This has been read by national courts as not requiring much to maintain a
national registration.117
The test of genuine use is common to both national and EU law, with
the only difference being that the use of the EUTM has to be “in the Union”
whereas use of a national mark has to occur “in the Member State” in question.118 However, one of the advantages of the EUTM touted by the EUIPO
at the time of its adoption was that in comparison to a bundle of counterpart
national rights (the pre-EUTM reality), an EUTM could be maintained, so it
was argued, by use in a single member state; such use would also be use “in
the EU.” 119 To maintain the bundle of counterpart national rights, and thus
rights across Europe, the trader would have had to use its mark in all member states of the European Union within five years of registration. Indeed,
the trader would have to maintain such use in all countries, subject to revocation for non-use in particular member states. 120 In contrast, because the
EUTM could (under the EUIPO’s reading) be maintained with use in a single country, the mark owner would have the European market space reserved
for beyond five years even if it had not expanded its business to the panEuropean level. It could choose to do so over a longer period of time,
depending upon what made most business sense at any one time.
The EUIPO’s original reading of the provision has, however, been
rejected by the Court of Justice. In Leno Merken, the applicant had sought to
register OMEL as a Benelux mark in connection with a number of services,
prompting an opposition by the proprietor of an EUTM in the mark ONEL
for similar services registered more than five years earlier.121 As permitted by
national and EU law in such circumstances, the applicant asked the opponent to demonstrate genuine use of the EUTM. Because the opponent could
116 Labs. Goëmar v. La Mer Tech. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 978 [19] (Eng.).
117 See id. at [21], [33] (holding that limited sales to an agent worth £800 were sufficient to defeat a claim that a mark should be revoked on the basis of non-use).
118 EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 15; 2008 Trade Mark Directive, art. 10.
119 EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 15.
120 For EUTMs that are registered based upon acquired distinctiveness, the approach
taken by the Court of Justice and General Court to Article 7(2) of the Regulation may
effectively require use in a substantial number of member states. For shapes and colors
that are likely to be noninherently distinctive throughout the European Union, this may
get close to requiring use everywhere. See infra notes 164, 195, 238 & 284; see also Ukulele
Orchestra of Gr. Brit. v. Clausen [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1772 [24] (Eng.).
121 See Leno Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV [2010] E.T.M.R. 21, ¶¶ 1–2 (Benelux
Office for Intellectual Prop. 2010). The applicant had little intention of using the mark in
the Benelux; instead he had aimed to offer his services in the Scandinavian countries and
had applied first in the Benelux (he claimed) to serve as the home application for a
Madrid Protocol application encompassing Norway and Sweden. See id. ¶ 23.
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prove use only in the Netherlands, the Benelux office denied the opposition,
finding that the EUTM on which the opponent relied had not been put to
genuine use in the EU and was consequently subject to revocation.122 The
Dutch courts asked the Court of Justice whether use in a single member state
was sufficient to maintain an EUTM.123
As a purely textual matter, use in a member state was use “in the Union”;
but how did the territory for which the registration was issued affect the
extent of such use required to constitute “genuine use”? In Joint Minutes
arguably forming part of the legislative history to the Regulation,124 the
Council and the Commission had indicated that “use which is genuine within
the meaning of Article 15 in one country constitutes genuine use in the
[EU].”125 That had informed EUIPO Guidelines that suggested likewise,
and had been an important part of the basis on which the EUTM was sold to
traders as an attractive alternative to national rights.126 And the holding by
the Benelux Intellectual Property Office provoked (somewhat irrational) outcries and prophecies of doom from the Commission.127 But the Court of
Justice attached little weight to these concerns (or either the Joint Minutes or
Guidelines) and refused to endorse the EUIPO position because the court
had decided in prior cases that the territorial scope of use was only one factor
in assessing whether the use was sufficient to maintain rights.128
Moreover, Article 112(2)(a) of the Regulation provided that:
Conversion [from an EUTM to a national mark] shall not take place[ ]
where the rights of the proprietor of the [EUTM] have been revoked on the
grounds of non-use, unless in the Member State for which conversion is requested
the [EU] trade mark has been put to use which would be considered to be genuine use
under the laws of that Member State.129
122 See id. ¶ 39.
123 See Case C-149/11, Leno Merken BV v. Hageldruis Beheer BV, EU:C:2012:422, ¶ 24.
124 In a number of cases, the court has been reluctant to give much weight to the Minutes. See Case C-104/01, Libertel Grp. BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, EU:C:2003:244, ¶ 25;
Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH, EU:C:2004:384, ¶¶ 16–17.
125 Council and Commission Joint Statements of Dec. 20, 1993, at the Adoption of
Council Regulation No. 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11/1) (EC),
No. 10 regarding art. 15, 1996 O.J. OHIM (5/96), 613–15.
126 OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MKT. (TRADE MARKS AND DESIGNS),
GUIDELINES CONCERNING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE
INTERNAL MARKET: THE MANUAL CONCERNING OPPOSITION, pt. 6, at 14 (2007), http://euipo
.europa.eu/en/mark/marque/pdf/manual/PartC_proof_of_use.pdf.
127 See Annette Kur, What Kind of Use Is This? Open Questions After ONEL/OMEL 3 (Max
Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop. & Competition L. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1315 2013) (reporting that “[f]ollowing a question posed by interested members of the European Parliament, Commissioner Barnier appeared in session and conjured up the danger
that any tightening of the requirements for genuine use might seriously compromise the
capacity of SMEs to defend themselves against counterfeiting, arguing that only by
obtaining and safely maintaining rights in [an EUTM] would they be able to effectively
prevent fake merchandise from entering the EU market”).
128 See Leno Merken, EU:C:2012:422, ¶¶ 30, 38–39 (Sharpston, A.G.).
129 See EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 112(2)(a) (emphasis added).
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This last caveat would make no sense if use sufficient to maintain a
national registration was ipso facto sufficient to maintain an EUTM. But the
court did not rule out the possibility that use in a single member state might
be sufficient to amount to genuine use in the Union. 130 Thus, use in a
single state might be sufficient to maintain an EUTM, but it was not necessarily so.131
In reaching its somewhat open-ended decision, the Leno Merken court
did mention the concern of unused marks, and the fear that an overly liberal
approach might impede rather than facilitate free movement.132 And the
court commented cryptically that “[a]ccount must . . . be taken . . . of the
difference between the territorial extent of the protection conferred on
national trade marks and that of the protection afforded [EU] marks.”133
The court’s approach, however, was very much driven by the proposition that
in order to respect the unitary nature of EUTMs and further the objectives of
the Regulation, “the territorial borders of the Member States should be disregarded in the assessment of ‘genuine use in the [Union].’”134 This vision of
a borderless Europe, consisting of a single market, is painted vividly both by
the court and the Advocate General, and appears to have swayed the court
against attaching dispositive weight to the number of member states in which
the mark was used.
The court thus made clear how territorial considerations were not relevant in applying Article 15. But it did little else to clarify the standard. It
offered no elaboration, for example, of the significance of its statement that
130 See Leno Merken, EU:C:2012:422, ¶¶ 49–51 (Sharpston, A.G.).
131 The Leno Merken court also rejected another rule that had been suggested in the
literature. In particular, it declined to adopt a requirement that a mark be used in a “substantial part of the [Union],” notwithstanding that the court in PAGO Int’l GmbH v. Tiro
Milch registrierte Genossenschaft mbH interpreted the requirement of “reputation in the
[Union]”—which is a precondition for an EUTM to receive extended protection against
dilution—as imposing that threshold. See id. ¶ 53; see also Case C-301/07, PAGO Int’l
GmbH v. Tiro Milch GmbH, 2009 E.C.R. I-9429, ¶ 30. The consequence of being found to
lack a reputation—upon mere scope of protection—was quite different from a rule that
would invalidate the mark entirely. See also Commission Memorandum on the Creation of an
EEC Trade Mark, ¶ 126, SEC (1976) 2462 (July 6, 1976).
132 See Leno Merken, EU:C:2012:816, ¶ 32 (Second Chamber judgment).
133 Id. ¶ 33. The Benelux office was far clearer in how the extent of protection conferred by an EUTM should affect the approach to what constituted genuine use. See Leno
Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV [2010] E.T.M.R. 21, ¶ 34 (Benelux Office of Intellectual Prop. 2010) (“[A]ligning the territory of the [EU] with that of one single member
state can lead to undesirable and unreasonable results. Since the establishment of the
[EU] Trade Mark Regulation the European Union has grown steadily to 27 member states
and further expansion is imminent. The actual and economic context has changed dramatically as a result. In a territory (currently) covering more than four million square
kilometres and a (current) population of almost 500 million people, use in one member
state only may essentially boil down to local use only. In the Office’s opinion, such use is
not acceptable in order to justify such an extensive exclusive right.” (citing 2008 Trade
Mark Directive, supra note 7, at recital 9)).
134 Leno Merken, EU:C:2012:816, ¶ 44; see also id. ¶ 42.
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the EU as a whole was the market against which the sufficiency of the use
necessary to maintain EUTM rights had to be assessed.135 The court instead
fell back on the standard test, with only a small acknowledgment of the relevant territory:
[An EUTM] is put to ‘genuine use’ . . . when it is used in accordance
with its essential function and for the purpose of maintaining or creating
market share within the [Union] for the goods or services covered by it, [in
which assessment] the territorial extent and the scale of the use [is
relevant].136

As Annette Kur commented at the time, “so much has been left open for
anyone’s guessing that it’s impossible to say what the decision actually
means.”137 But there was a prevailing view, perhaps reflected in the minimal
alteration that occurred in the Examination Guidelines at the EUIPO, that
extensive use in a medium-sized country would likely constitute genuine use
in the Union sufficient to maintain an EUTM and EU-wide rights. As
explained below in Part V, this conventional wisdom is being challenged as
national courts begin to appreciate the costs of the gap between the legal
fiction of a single European market and a quite different reality on the
ground. And that will substantially inform how we see territorial overlaps.
B.

Scope of Relief

Another purported benefit of the EUTM was that the owner of an
EUTM would be able to secure relief throughout the whole of Europe in a
single proceeding. Historically, one of the manifestations of territoriality has
been that the enforcement of intellectual property rights could only be
secured from the courts of the country that granted the right. 138 The Court
of Justice has substantially frustrated efforts of some national courts to use
the EU Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and Judgments to grant crossborder relief in the case of registered intellectual property rights. 139

135 See id. ¶ 36 (“[T]he phrase ‘in the Community’ is intended to define the geographical market serving as the reference point for all consideration of whether a Community
trade mark has been put to genuine use.”).
136 Id. ¶ 58.
137 Kur, supra note 127, at 1. Even if it was a disappointing judgment, it had been
largely expected. See id. at 4 n.14 (citing Annette Kur, Unitary Rights in Fragmented Markets?
Some Thoughts on the CTM System and Its Interaction With National Law, in HARMONISATION OF
EUROPEAN IP LAW: FROM EUROPEAN RULES TO BELGIAN LAW AND PRACTICE: CONTRIBUTIONS
IN HONOUR OF FRANK GOTZEN 117, 119 (2012)).
138 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law:
The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 716 & 772 (2009).
139 See Annette Kur, A Farewell to Cross-Border Injunctions? The ECJ Decisions GAT v. LuK
and Roche Nederland v. Primus and Goldenberg, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 844, 849 (2006).
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The EUTM appeared to avoid these problems. 140 The Regulation created so-called EU Trade Mark courts sitting throughout the EU, although in
practice these are merely designated national trademark courts donning
EUTM hats.141 And the Regulation also created what is termed “international jurisdiction,” which gave those EUTM courts that were exercising jurisdiction by virtue of the domicile or appearance or consent of the parties
(rather than the alleged place of infringement) the power to adjudicate
alleged infringements throughout the EU.142 Genuine EU-wide relief
seemed a possibility.143
In DHL Express France SAS v. Chronopost SA, the Court of Justice endorsed
EU-wide relief as the default position, but appeared to carve out a small
exception.144 In DHL, Chronopost owned the French and EU trademarks
for WEBSHIPPING for services for the collection and delivery of mail.145
DHL used the same word to designate its Internet-based express mail management service. The French court found infringement of both the French
and EUTM registration. But the Cour de cassation asked the Court of Justice
whether it should automatically award EU-wide injunctive relief, as would be
suggested by the unitary principle embodied in Article 1(2) of the EUTMR.
The court built its answer on the centrality of the unitary principle: in
cases where a court was exercising international jurisdiction, “[i]n order to
ensure . . . uniform protection, a prohibition against further infringement or
threatened infringement issued by a competent [EUTM] court must . . . as a
rule, extend to the entire area of the European Union.”146 However, the
court also acknowledged that the injunction may “in certain circumstances,
be restricted” because the trademark right is only:
140 Roland Mallinson, Trade Marks in the EU: One Right, One Law, One Decision—Or Not?,
29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 432 (2007); Alexander von Mühlendahl, Community Trade Mark
Riddles: Territoriality and Unitary Character, 30 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 66, 66–70
(2008).
141 EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 95. The United Kingdom designated the High Court
and the Patents County Court (in England and Wales). See The Community Trade Mark
Regulations 2006, reg. 12, SI 2007/1027 (Eng.).
142 See EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 98(1) (conferring jurisdiction on courts seized on the
basis of Articles 97(1)–(4) in respect of “acts of infringement committed or threatened
within the territory of any of the Member States”); id. art. 98(2) (conferring jurisdiction on
courts seized on the basis of Article 97(5) “only in respect of acts [of infringement] committed or threatened within the territory of the Member State in which that court is
situated”).
143 Article 102(1) of the EUTMR provides:
Where an EU trade mark court finds . . . infringe[ment] . . . it shall, unless
there are special reasons for not doing so, issue an order prohibiting the defendant from proceeding with the acts which infringed or would infringe the EU
trade mark. It shall also take such measures in accordance with its national law as
are aimed at ensuring that this prohibition is complied with.
EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 102(1).
144 Case C-235/09, DHL Express Fr. SAS v. Chronopost SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-2801.
145 Id. ¶ 20.
146 Id. ¶ 44.
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conferred in order to enable that proprietor to protect his specific interests
as such, that is, to ensure that the trade mark is able to fulfil its functions.
The exercise of that right must therefore be reserved to cases in which a
third party’s use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the
trade mark.147

In practical terms, this means that an injunction for infringement of an
EUTM adjudicated in a court with international jurisdiction has effect
throughout the entire area of the EU, unless (1) the plaintiff does not assert
infringement of its trade mark outside a particular territory; or (2) “the
defendant proves that the use of the sign at issue does not affect or is not
liable to affect the functions of the trade mark” in a particular group of member states.148 As to the latter, the court specifically mentioned only the effect
of different linguistic usage in those territories.149
Again, this was conventionally seen as a small carve out from the default
rule; in most cases, EU-wide relief would be the norm. But again national
courts have pushed back. As explained below in Part V, this resistance arguably stems from the court effectively endorsing both of what I have elsewhere
called the “political” and “intrinsic” conceptions of territoriality. Trademark
rights might be “territorial because the intrinsic purpose of trademark law
suggests extending (and limiting) rights to the geographic reach of goodwill.”150 In contrast, regulations about the “enforcement of trademark rights
assume their territorial quality because of their connection to political institutions with territorially defined sovereignty. Thus, some aspects of territoriality are rooted in social and commercial practices that dictate the reach of a
brand, while other aspects are a function of political or policymaking
authority.”151
The approach adopted by the court is an attempt to reconcile the political territoriality of the EUTM (which allows unitary rights to be adjudicated
by courts having EU-wide jurisdiction and granting relief for the EU) with
147 Id. ¶ 46 (citation omitted); see also id. ¶ 47 (“[T]he territorial scope of that right,
may not extend beyond what that right allows its proprietor to do in order to protect his
trade mark, that is, to prohibit only uses which are liable to affect the functions of the trade
mark. The acts or future acts of a defendant (namely the person whose use of the [EU]
trade mark is complained of) which do not affect the functions of the [EU] trade mark,
cannot therefore be prohibited.”).
148 Id. ¶ 48; cf. Re Home Depot Inc. [2005] E.T.M.R. 100, ¶ 61 (Ger. Hanseatic Higher
Regional Ct. 2005) (affirming automatic grant of EU-wide injunction, though noting that
this might not be so clear if there is “no risk of confusion . . . in another country”), aff’d,
The Home Depot Trade Mark [2009] E.T.M.R. 63, ¶¶ 36–38 (Ger. Fed. Ct. of Justice
2007).
149 See DHL Express France SAS, 2011 E.C.R. I-2825, ¶ 48. Limiting relief to those places
where the defendant’s use would have an adverse effect on the functions of the plaintiff’s
mark can be used to validate the doctrine of honest concurrent use. See Budejovicky
Budvar NP v. Anheuser-Busch Inc. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 880 (Eng.) (discussing honest concurrent use); Case C-482/09, Budejovicky Budvar NP v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 2011 E.C.R.
I-8701.
150 Dinwoodie, supra note 13.
151 Id. at 888.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL409.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 33

11-MAY-17

territorial overlaps in trademark law

9:02

1701

the intrinsic territoriality of trademarks in Europe (which frequently will
cause third-party uses to operate differently in different markets, causing confusion in some but not others).152 As discussed below, the way in which
national courts balance these conceptions is affected by the institutional
design choices made by the drafters of the Regulation, and the vision of
Europe that one seeks to project. And the balance struck will have important
consequences for how we handle territorial overlaps.
V.

APPLICATIONS

OF

LENO MERKEN
A.

AND

DHL: RESISTANCE?

Genuine Use

The supposition that use in a single large country in the European
Union would constitute genuine use in the EU has been cast into doubt by a
recent decision of the Enterprise Court in the United Kingdom, The Sofa
Workshop v. Sofaworks.153 Trademark officials have criticized the Sofaworks
decision. And it is arguably at odds with decisions elsewhere in Europe (and
at the EUIPO).154 But it is a careful exposition of Leno Merken, and another
judge in the English High Court has suggested in dicta that he finds it convincing. The case represents clear resistance by the U.K. courts to an enthusiastic embrace of unitary marks without regard to their real costs and
benefits.
In Sofaworks, the plaintiff owned EUTM registrations for SOFA WORKSHOP for use in connection with a variety of goods and services. The mark
was used extensively in the United Kingdom (and online), but not elsewhere
in the EU (except for one sale and some advertising in EU-wide magazines
152 See DHL Express France SAS, 2011 E.C.R. I-2825, ¶ 33 (“[T]he territorial scope of a
prohibition against further infringement . . . is to be determined both by the territorial
jurisdiction of the [EU] trade mark court issuing that prohibition and by the territorial
extent of the [EU] trade mark proprietor’s exclusive right which is adversely affected by
the infringement . . . .”); see also id. ¶ 46.
153 Sofa Workshop Ltd. v. Sofaworks Ltd. [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1773 (Eng.).
154 See, e.g., Case R 2312/2015-4, Carinopharm GmbH v. Therabel Pharm. Ltd., 2016
E.C.R. I-____; Case R 638/2015-4, Weghaupt v. Trade Union Vision, 2016 E.C.R.I-____,
¶ 32 (holding that use only in Austria was sufficient, noting that “Article 15 [EUTMR] does
not require a trans-border or European-wide dimension of the use . . . . The Board also
does not agree with the proposition that use of [an EUTM] must necessarily be of a larger
intensity or dimension than the use of a national mark”); Case T-398/13, TVR Auto. Ltd. v.
OHIM, EU:T:2015:503 (finding genuine use based upon use only in the United Kingdom);
Case T-278/13, Now Wireless Ltd. v. OHIM, EU:T:2015:57, ¶ 49 (“[T]he use of the mark in
the geographical area comprising London and the Thames Valley was sufficient to constitute genuine use in the European Union”); No. I ZR 106/11, GRUR 925, ¶¶ 31–33 (Ger.
Fed. Ct. of Justice 2013) (revoking the EUTM for insufficient evidence of use, but interpreting Leno Merken to mean that use in Germany was sufficient in terms of geographic
scope to constitute genuine use in the EU); see also Annual Review of EU Trademark Law:
Non-Use, and Proof of Use, 104 TRADEMARK REP. 582, 595 (2014); cf. Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters], Jan. 21, 2014, Bull. civ. IV, No. 13-12501 (Fr.) (“[I]n
certain circumstances, [genuine use] may result from the use of the mark in the territory
of only one Member State.”).
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that the court found largely aimed at U.K. consumers). When the defendant
began using the mark SOFAWORKS for similar goods and services, the plaintiff sued for infringement of the EUTM. The defendant argued that the
SOFA WORKSHOP mark, which had been registered for over five years, had
not been put to genuine use in the EU, and thus should be revoked for nonuse.
The court applied the Court of Justice’s judgment in Leno Merken, recognizing that “[a]lthough the difference between the territorial protection provided by [an EU] mark and that provided by a national mark must be taken
into account, the Court [in that case] was not specific about how this affects
the question of genuine use.”155 However, Judge Hacon noted two passages
in Leno Merken where the Court of Justice appeared to hint at what the effect
might be. In particular, the Court of Justice had mused both that “it is reasonable to expect that [an EU] trade mark should be used in a larger area
than a national mark” and that:
there is admittedly some justification for thinking that [an EU] trade mark
should—because it enjoys more extensive territorial protection than a
national trade mark—be used in a larger area than the territory of a single
Member State in order for the use to be regarded as “genuine use.”156

Some scholars such as Annette Kur had spotted that language at the
time of the Leno Merken decision, and had relied on it to conclude that the
court was positioning itself closer to the Hungarian and Danish offices, which
had suggested stricter approaches to genuine use in the debate leading to
Leno Merken.157 However, Professor Kur thought that “the lines quoted . . .
[were] substantially qualified by the Court’s unequivocal confirmation of the
principle that territorial borders of the Member States must be disregarded
in the assessment of genuine use in the [Union].” 158 Judge Hacon gave
those lines far greater force. Thus, he argued that “[t]he Court’s ‘some justification for thinking’ could be taken to imply that in the general run of
things—in the absence of one or more countervailing considerations—genuine use in just one Member State will not be sufficient to qualify as genuine
use in the [EU] as a whole.”159 Likewise, he placed weight on the comment
that “it is reasonable to expect that [an EU] trade mark should be used in a
larger area than a national mark” to imply that use in more than one member state is a default requirement for genuine use in the EU.160
155 Sofa Workshop, [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1773, at [17].
156 Id. at [21], [23] (quoting Case C-149/11, Leno Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer
BV, EU:C:2012:816, ¶¶ 50, 54).
157 See Kur, supra note 127, at 6; see also MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 1.40, at 16;
Summary of Case No. M0900377 “C City Hotel”, HUNGARIAN INTELL. PROP. OFF., http://www
.hipo.gov.hu/sites/default/files/English/hirek/kapcsolodo/C_City_case_summary_ENfi
nal.pdf.
158 Kur, supra note 127, at 6.
159 Sofa Workshop, [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1773 at [22].
160 Id. at [23] (quoting Leno Merken, EU:C:2012:816, ¶ 54).
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Thus, Judge Hacon held that “in relation to the territorial extent of use,
genuine use in the [EU] will in general require use in more than one Member State.”161 This appears to switch the default assumption that many scholars made after Leno Merken. As a result, he concluded:
For national marks the geographical extent of use is a factor to be taken
into account, but it is apparently of no great weight. In respect of [EU]
marks the geographical extent of use is, in the general run, crucial: it must
extend at least beyond the boundaries of one Member State. By way of a
non-exhaustive exception to the general rule, this does not apply where the
market for the goods or services is confined to one Member State.162

This conclusion was based not only on a parsing of the ambiguous language of the Leno Merken opinion, but upon the logic of the difference
between the purpose of the national and EU rights (and the reality of the
national and EU markets):
A rough and ready assumption can be made that a trade mark proprietor
who sells his products to one customer in one town in Spain may in due
course wish to trade all across that country. This justifies maintenance of the
mark for the whole of Spain. It cannot in the same way be assumed that a
trader in one Member State will wish to expand his trade across the EU.
Accordingly[,] in order to maintain [an EU] mark, some evidence should be
required that the mark has been used to create or maintain a share in the
market for the relevant goods or services across a section of the EU
extending beyond one Member State. Looked at another way, an applicant
for [an EU] mark must be taken to intend to use it outside one Member
State and has five years in which to justify his presumed intention. Otherwise he risks having to make do with a national mark by conversion and
leaving the sign in question free for use elsewhere in the [EU].163

In light of this recognition of the different levels of market integration
in the national and EU markets, the court revoked the EUTM registration for
non-use.164 Yet, Judge Hacon also held that—had the EUTM been valid—
infringement would have been made out based upon a likelihood of confusion (involving, presumably, an average EU consumer).165 Indeed, he tested
this conclusion against what he called “secondary evidence” of actual confu161 Id. at [25].
162 Id. at [26].
163 Id. at [28].
164 The court also found that the mark lacked acquired distinctiveness in other Englishspeaking member states and would thus be invalid on that basis. Id. at [72]; see infra notes
195 & 284; see also Ukulele Orchestra of Gr. Brit. v. Clausen [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1772
[40] (Eng.) (holding that the plaintiff prevailed under passing off, but that the EUTM was
invalidated for lacking acquired distinctiveness in English-speaking member states other
than the United Kingdom, because “[a] more relaxed policy would lead to the paradox
that an application for a national trade mark could be refused registration because the sign
in question is descriptive in that Member State, whereas an application for [an EUTM] in
respect of exactly the same sign could be granted because it has acquired distinctiveness
somewhere else in the [Union]”).
165 See Sofa Workshop, [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1773 at [89].
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sion, and concluded that “among a proportion of relevant actual consumers,
which is well above de minimis although markedly less than half the total,
there is a belief because of the similarity between mark and sign that the
respective goods of Sofa Workshop and Sofaworks come from the same or
economically-linked undertakings.”166 In light of this analysis—which inevitably is heavily informed by confusion occurring in the United Kingdom
because the goods were sold in the United Kingdom—some relief was surely
desirable. 167 It was thus reassuring that the plaintiff still prevailed under its
passing-off claim under English law, based upon the goodwill that had developed through its use in the United Kingdom. 168
Passing off is not the “national backup” that the EUTMR contemplates
when an EUTM fails. Under Article 112(1)(b) of the Regulation, the owner
of an EUTM may request the conversion of its EUTM (or application therefor) into a national trademark application “to the extent that the [EUTM]
ceases to have effect.”169 And Article 112(6) contemplates that this may
occur as a result of an adverse decision of an EUTM court regarding validity.170 But the three-month window in which a request for conversion has to
be filed with the national office only begins when the judicial decision in
question becomes final.171 Thus, not surprisingly, the plaintiff in Sofaworks
had not filed any such application prior to the court’s decision.172 In either
instance, however, the relief would be limited to the United Kingdom;
indeed it is not unusual in passing-off cases for injunctions to be crafted with
an eye to the territory in which a mark has been used and in which therefore
there is goodwill to protect.173
Judge Hacon did recognize an exception to the stricter requirement for
cross-border use based upon dicta in Leno Merken found in both the court’s
judgment and in the opinion of the Advocate General. Thus, he suggested
that “[a]n exception to that general requirement [of cross-border use] arises
where the market for the relevant goods or services is restricted to the terri166 Id. at [115] (emphasis omitted).
167 This set of facts—confusion only in the United Kingdom resulting in notional
infringement of a mark largely used only in the United Kingdom, and resulting in passing
off and hence relief only in the United Kingdom—is worth comparing with what transpired in Enterprise, discussed below.
168 Sofa Workshop, [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1773 at [118]–[21].
169 EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 112(1)(b).
170 See id. art. 112(6).
171 Id.
172 Counsel for the plaintiff suggested that “in the event . . . Sofa Workshop’s [EUTM]s
were . . . liable to be revoked for non-use . . . [the court] should make findings expressly
directed to whether the [EUTM]s can be converted into one or more national trade mark
applications and if so, which ones.” Sofa Workshop, [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1773 at [116].
The court decided not to consider conversion because no application to convert had been
made.
173 Cf. Assoc. Newspapers Ltd. v. Express Newspapers [2003] EWHC (Ch) 1322 [29]
(Eng.).
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tory of a single Member State.”174 Although the judge was following the lead
he detected in the dicta in Leno Merken, this “exception” is less persuasive
than his earlier analysis. Consider the example used by Advocate General
Sharpston in footnote 31 of her Leno Merken opinion (which I may or may
not describe as “light-hearted,” as did the Advocate General):
[A] successful vendor of deep-fried chocolate bars in Scotland might formulate a marketing plan to expand his business into France, Italy, Estonia and
Hungary. To that end, he registers an appropriate [EU] trade mark.
Despite his best commercial endeavours, the plan proves ill-conceived: unaccountably, consumers in those Member States appear wedded to their own
national culinary delicacies and unwilling to be tempted by the new offering.
The lack of commercial success would not affect the analysis of whether
there had been genuine use of the mark. By contrast, the fact that demand
for a particular product in question was concentrated, at a particular point,
in a specific geographical area would be relevant to the assessment.175

On the facts presented in the hypothetical, a more relaxed approach to
use, thus validating EU-wide rights, seems precisely the wrong way round. As
Advocate General Sharpston noted in her Leno Merken opinion, “[An EU]
trade mark enables undertakings to adapt their activities to the scale of the
internal market. Indeed, it was established for undertakings which want to
deploy or continue activities on [a Union] level and wish to do so immediately or soon.”176 If there is no real market outside the one country, and
none likely to develop for cultural reasons or because of the nature of the
goods, should that not lean in favor of limiting the rights to the single
national market? Treating this as a factor favoring a conclusion of genuine
use in the EU seems unhelpful and unnecessary.
The stricter reading given to Leno Merken by Judge Hacon has been
largely endorsed (with slightly different framing) by another U.K. judge, Mr.
Justice Arnold, in London Taxi Corp. v. Frazer-Nash Research, and is consistent
with decisions of the U.K. Appointed Person.177 But Sofaworks has been heav174 Sofa Workshop, [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1773 at [25].
175 Case C-149/11, Leno Merken B.V. v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV, EU:C:2012:422, ¶ 50
n.31(Sharpston, A.G.).
176 Id. ¶ 45.
177 London Taxi Corp. v. Frazer-Nash Research [2016] EWHC (Ch) 52 [230] (Eng.)
(“[W]hile I find the thrust of Judge Hacon’s analysis of Leno persuasive, I would not myself
express the applicable principles in terms of a general rule and an exception to that general rule. Rather, I would prefer to say that the assessment is a multi-factorial one which
includes the geographical extent of the use.”); Intermar Simanto v. Nike Innovate, No. O222-16, [13] (U.K. Intellectual Prop. Org. 2016) (holding that the sale of 55,000 pairs of
footwear to a Bulgarian company does not amount to genuine use in the EU). The
Appointed Person noted:
I do not think that a hearing officer can be criticised for concluding that in the
context of the specification in question there is no sufficient use ‘in the [Union]’
as required by the [EUTMR], if (as here) there has been both a low volume of
sales (by reasonable standards) which has been confined in effect to a single shop
in a single town in a single member state of the [Union] over a relatively short
part of the relevant period (with some exiguous trade sales elsewhere of uncer-
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ily criticized by practitioners (especially outside the United Kingdom) and
trademark offices.178 Judge Hacon may or may not be exactly right about his
reading of Leno Merken in Sofaworks, and the exception he recognized for
single market goods seems dubious. But he is thinking about the right questions, and trying to incorporate regard for the costs and benefits of unitary
rights in his analysis. The open language of Leno Merken surely gives room
for this type of approach.
Moreover, this analysis should also include a normative component: are
there some traders who we wish to encourage to pursue registration nationally or regionally, as the case may be, or some contexts in which we might
want to steer traders towards expanded markets? As we ask courts to consider how strongly to weigh those considerations, it would be helpful for
scholars to study data to determine the extent of support for the premises
driving Judge Hacon. As Annette Kur commented in the wake of Leno
Merken, “[I]f a large proportion of registered [EUTMs] are only used on a
minimal level, this might indicate a certain malfunctioning of the system,
which was after all explicitly designed for undertakings to adapt their activities to the scale of the [EU].” 179
B.

Scope of Relief

National courts initially adopted a pragmatic approach to the application of DHL, which seemed congruent with the idea of the default relief
being EU-wide.180 In Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer, a trial court in the
United Kingdom had upheld Interflora’s claim that a competitor’s purchase
tain ultimate destination). That is, of course, not to say that, in appropriate cases,
in certain markets, in other contexts, such may be considered sufficient. All
depends on the particular facts of a case.
Id. at [61].
178 See, e.g., Volker Schoene, Use of a Community Trade Mark in Only One Member State Does
Not Maintain the Right, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 147, 147–48 (2016).
179 See Kur, supra note 127, at 8.
180 For the French court on remand, see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court],
Nov. 29, 2012 [2013] E.T.M.R. 8, ¶¶ 7–8 (Fr.) (finding that the Court of Appeal “implied
that the [EU] Trade Mark Court was informed of the national laws providing a comparable
measure and that the risk of confusion between the signs involved had only been appreciated as regards the perception which French or French speaking consumers could have of
it. In basing its decision on this consideration, with reasons from which it did not follow
that the existence of a risk of confusion was limited to France alone, the Court of Appeal
had failed to give a legal basis to its decision”). The litigation does not appear to have
concluded; at least, the French Court of Appeal has yet to issue a final decision. In a
judgment of November 25, 2014, the court decided to stay the infringement proceedings
at the request of DHL until the EUIPO reached a final decision in the cancellation proceedings being pursued on grounds of non-use. In January 2015, the Board of Appeal of
the OHIM overturned the decision of the Cancellation Division and held the EUTM to be
valid. See Chronopost (Société par actions simplifiée) v. DHL Express (Fr.) SAS, Case R
2425/2013-4 (Office for Harmonization of the Internal Mkt. 2015). This decision was
appealed by DHL before the General Court, and later withdrawn. See Case T-142/15, DHL
Express (Fr.) SAS v. EUIPO, EU:T:2016:28.
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of keyword advertising tied to the INTERFLORA mark amounted to infringement of its EUTM. But the court had conducted its analysis by reference to
“reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant internet users in UK”
and had made no finding with regard to Internet users in other member
states. 181 Mr. Justice Arnold rejected the defendant’s efforts to restrict
injunction to the United Kingdom—or, “at worst from [the defendant’s] perspective . . . to those other Member States whose superior courts had made
findings of infringement [in keyword advertising cases].”182 The defendant
had “relied upon the fact that courts in other Member States, and in particular the [supreme court] in Germany,” had (at that time) largely concluded
that keyword advertising tied to a competitor’s mark did not constitute trademark infringement.183 But those conclusions were based on the specific facts
of the cases before the foreign courts and on the evidence adduced in those
cases. The defendant had “adduced no evidence to show that internet users
in other Member States had different characteristics to, or interpreted [the
defendant’s] advertisements in a different manner than, UK users.”184 And
Mr. Justice Arnold imposed the burden on the defendants to prove such
local variation. Thus, it appeared that the U.K. courts would assume as a
default that European consumers are no different from those in the United
Kingdom, and require defendants to make the case for a carve out if they
wished relief restricted to less than the entire EU.185
However, that decision may have turned in large part upon the nature of
the infringement claim in that case, which was a so-called “double identity”
claim; the defendant was using a mark identical to the mark of the plaintiff
on identical goods or services. In a series of cases at that time, Mr. Justice
Arnold had sought to reconcile Court of Justice caselaw that rendered
unclear the relationship between double-identity claims and other claims
(such as those dependent upon proving likely confusion).186 He had
reached the conclusion that in a double-identity case, which (under the pertinent legislation) was not dependent upon proving likely confusion, a defendant could however potentially escape liability by showing an absence of likely
181 Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc [2013] EWHC (Ch) 1484 [34].
182 Id. at [36].
183 Id. at [36].
184 Id. at [35].
185 See also Hearst Holdings Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 439 [192] (“The
[plaintiffs’] evidence addressed activity outside the UK, included examples of Betty Boop
merchandise in France and Spain and included sales figures for a number of EU countries.
Having found trade mark infringement in the UK, I can see no reason why the same conclusion should not follow elsewhere in Europe. The defendants did not suggest that if
infringement was found when considering the United Kingdom, there was any reason not
to extend that conclusion Europe wide.”); cf. Fage UK Ltd. v. Chobani UK Ltd. [2014]
EWCA (Civ) 5 [79] & [175] (addressing relationship between the average consumer and
the public to be considered under national law).
186 See, e.g., DataCard Corp. v. Eagle Techs. Ltd. [2011] EWHC (Pat) 244 [254], [281].
See generally Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 92, at 360–75.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL409.txt

1708

unknown

Seq: 40

notre dame law review

11-MAY-17

9:02

[vol. 92:4

confusion.187 By doing so, the defendant would be demonstrating that its
use would not have an adverse effect on the origin function of the plaintiff’s
mark, which is an extra-statutory element that the Court of Justice has incorporated into infringement analysis generally, and which is of greatest impact
in double-identity cases.188 When the trial judgment in Interflora was
reversed by the Court of Appeal, one of the bases for reversal was the appellate court’s rejection of the use of this so-called “reverse confusion” test. 189
However, Mr. Justice Arnold has since reaffirmed that, despite the reversal in
Interflora, he believes that the “reverse confusion” test remains good law
outside the context of keyword advertising.190
Although placing the burden on the defendant seeking to limit relief to
show a lack of likely confusion might turn on this substantive element of
187 See DataCard, [2011] EWHC (Civ) 244 at [263], [268] (“[T]he test which must be
applied in order to determine whether the use of the sign complained of is liable to affect
the origin function of the trade mark is a reverse likelihood of confusion test . . . i.e. the
onus lies upon the third party to show that the use of the sign in context is sufficiently clear
that there is no possibility of confusion on the part of the average consumer as to the
origin of the advertised goods or services.”). I say “potentially” because in a double-identity
claim, the plaintiff may also prevail by showing an adverse effect on the other functions of
a mark (such as the quality, advertising, or investment functions). See Case C-487/07,
L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 58. In theory, this (unlike adverse effect
on the origin function) might involve something short of confusion. But there are no
cases assessing in any detail the adverse effect on these functions when there is explicitly no
adverse effect on the origin function. Strictly, this was the posture in Bellure, but on
remand to the U.K. courts, the U.K. court opted simply to take what it saw as a strong hint
from the Court of Justice that there should be infringement without identifying which
functions were adversely affected in that case, as Lord Justice Jacob complained at the
time. See L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535 [30]–[31] (“I have real difficulty with these functions when divorced from the origin function. There is nothing in the
legislation about them. Conceptually they are vague and ill-defined. . . . So far as this case
is concerned, however, it seems that the Court has indicated the answer as to whether the
use is within Art. 5(1(a). . . . I confess I do not know where [the] line is, but this case falls
the wrong side of it. Why? Because the Court has said so. It regards the use as affecting
the communication, advertising and investment functions of the mark.”). In fact, although
I am sympathetic to the interpretative compromise that Mr. Justice Arnold has found, this
is another consideration that does make the double-identity cases more favorable to the
plaintiff than an Article 5(1)(b) case without having to play with the burden of proof.
188 See Joined Cases C-236/08–C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶¶ 82–90; Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Reed,
2002 E.C.R. I-10273, ¶ 50.
189 See Interflora (Interflora III), [2014] EWCA (Civ) 1403 [151] (Kitchin, L.J.) (“The
judge wrongly held . . . that the onus [in a case under Article 5(1)(a)] lies on the third
party advertiser to show that the use of the sign in context is sufficiently clear that there is
no real risk of confusion on the part of the average consumer as to the origin of the
advertised goods or services.”).
190 See Supreme Petfoods Ltd. v. Henry Bell & Co. (Grantham) Ltd. [2015] EWHC
(Ch) 256 [158], [163]–[64] (“To the extent that the Court of Appeal’s dicta went beyond
keyword advertising, they were obiter. . . . [I]t is unclear which party bears the burden of
proof . . . . [T]his is an important issue of European trade mark law which will have to be
referred to the CJEU for determination, preferably sooner rather than later.”).
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trademark infringement law, it could also perhaps be deduced directly from
the language in DHL justifying less than EU-wide rights. The DHL court had
allowed for derogation from full relief where:
[T]he applicant for a prohibition order has restricted the territorial scope of
its action in exercising its freedom to determine the extent of that action or
because the defendant proves that the use of the sign at issue does not affect or is
not liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, for example on linguistic
grounds.191

In a later case, Enterprise Holding Inc. v. Europcar Group UK Ltd., Mr. Justice Arnold seemed to emphasize the different burden of proving confusion
between double-identity and classic infringement claims as relevant to which
party bore the burden on the availability of EU-wide relief.192 That case
involved a dispute between two car rental companies involving a logo built
around the letter “e” on a green background. The court found infringement
of the plaintiff’s EUTM under the classic (confusion-based) infringement
cause of action.193 The court found that the mark was inherently distinctive,
and that it has acquired substantial distinctiveness through use, at least in the
United Kingdom. Under the multi-factor global appreciation test of the
Court of Justice, the acquired distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark cut in
favor of a finding of likely confusion.194 And Mr. Justice Arnold relied on
the enhanced distinctiveness in sustaining the confusion-based claim.195
In assessing the appropriate scope of injunctive relief in Enterprise, Mr.
Justice Arnold noted that the reasoning of the Court of Justice in DHL:
makes perfect sense in a case where the claim is for infringement pursuant
to [the double-identity provision], and if one interprets [that provision] as
throwing on to the defendant the burden of proving that the use of the sign
does not affect and is not liable to affect the functions of the trade mark.196
191 Case C-235/09, DHL Express Fr. SAS v. Chronopost SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-2801, ¶ 48
(emphasis added).
192 See Enter. Holding Inc. v. Europcar Grp. UK Ltd. [2015] EWHC (Ch) 300 [9]–[13]
(Eng.).
193 See Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Europcar Grp. UK Ltd. [2015] EWHC (Ch) 17 [216]
(Eng.).
194 See Case C-251/95, SABEL BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6191, ¶ 6.
195 If the validity (as opposed to strength) of the EUTM had depended upon acquired
distinctiveness, then the plaintiff would likely have seen its mark invalidated. Courts have
taken a very strict line on where a plaintiff must prove acquired distinctiveness of its EUTM
in order to overcome an absolute-grounds objection. See Case T-91/99, Ford Motor Co. v.
OHIM, 2000 E.C.R. II-1925, ¶¶ 16, 23 (in all parts of the EU where a problem exists, there
has to be resolution of such problem); see also Case C-108/05, Bovemij Verzekeringen NV
v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2006 E.C.R. I-7605; cf. Case T-112/13, Mondelez UK Holdings
v. EUIPO, EU:T:2016:735, ¶¶ 122–25; Case C-98/11 P, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v. OHIM, EU:C:2012:307, ¶¶ 62–63. And where the plaintiff had plausibly only
shown this in Germany (other than the United Kingdom), this would be unlikely to save
the EUTM. See Ukulele Orchestra of Gr. Brit. v. Clausen [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1772
(Eng.); Sofa Workshop Ltd. v. Sofaworks Ltd. [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1773 (Eng.).
196 See Enterprise, [2015] EWHC (Ch) 300 at [9].
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However, he thought that the logic of the DHL judgment did not obviously translate to the context of a claim based upon confusion or dilution,
where the burden of proving harm (or in one instance, unfair advantage)
rested with the plaintiff.197
Mr. Justice Arnold thought that the question was not clear.198 But he
suggested that in an infringement claim other than double identity, the burden of proving the adverse effects sufficient to warrant relief lay with the
plaintiff. And, because almost no evidence had been led regarding any other
countries (as is often the norm in EUTM cases), Mr. Justice Arnold was willing to conclude that the defendant’s use of the logo did not affect,199 and
was not liable to affect, the functions of the EUTM in any member state other
than the United Kingdom.200
Ultimately, Mr. Justice Arnold characterized his conclusion on the “lack
of adverse effects” exception to DHL (and the related question on burden)
as dicta, because he also thought that the exception to DHL based upon the
plaintiff’s restriction of the territorial scope of its action applied. 201 The
197 See id. at [10]. In Interflora, Mr. Justice Arnold had recognized that DHL had placed
the burden on the defendant in articulating its rule on scope of relief. Interflora, Inc. v.
Marks & Spencer plc [2013] EWHC (Ch) 1484 [33] (Eng.). But in Enterprise he understood the DHL holding to reflect the double-identity posture of that case.
198 See Enterprise, [2015] EWHC (Ch) 300 at [11].
199 Thus, the exception for varied territorial effects is not restricted to linguistic differences, the only example that had been offered by the DHL court. One might have thought
that the assessment of infringement of an inherently distinctive logo might have given rise
to the same result throughout Europe. But Mr. Justice Arnold resisted the logic of that
position, recognizing that actual use and distinctiveness created thereby might alter the
confusion conclusion. Thus, even if we treat confusion as a legal assessment to be made
through the fictional eyes of a European consumer, courts are likely to allow commercial
realities to intrude—and as national judges sitting as EUTM courts, these are likely to be
viewed through national prisms, even when language is not involved. In this case, the
variation was possibly caused by the different markets that existed and in which the parties
operated.
200 See Enterprise, [2015] EWHC (Ch) 300 at [27]. Mr. Justice Arnold commented that
if he were to make any finding in favor of Enterprise, it could only be with regard to
Germany, where there was some evidence upon which an inference of acquired distinctiveness could be based. Id. at [28].
201 Cf. Enter. Holdings Inc. v. Europcar Grp. UK Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3169
[22]–[23] (Morgan, J.). Mr. Justice Arnold concluded that his judgment would not create
any res judicata bar to allegations of infringement in any other member states. This is
arguably consistent with earlier caselaw in other member states. See Case I-20 U 110/04,
Rodeo Drive (Ger. Düsseldorf Higher Regional Ct. 2005); see also Mallinson, supra note
140. However, a narrow view of res judicata seems at odds with the positive goal of the
unitary right and with one of the other justifications offered by the DHL court for a default
of EU-wide injunctions, namely, the desire to avoid the risk that, by limiting relief to the
particular member states where infringement was found:
the defendant would begin to exploit the sign at issue afresh in a Member State
for which the prohibition had not been issued. In addition, the new judicial proceedings which the [EU] trade mark proprietor would be compelled to bring
would increase, in a manner proportional to those proceedings, the risk of incon-

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL409.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 43

territorial overlaps in trademark law

11-MAY-17

9:02

1711

plaintiff had in its Particulars of Claim sought a pan-European injunction.
But its pleaded case originally relied only on acts of infringement in the
United Kingdom, and a motion to amend the pleadings to allege acts of
infringement throughout the European Union was denied.202 (The court
did allow the plaintiff to amend to allege acts in the United Kingdom and
France, but by the end of trial the plaintiff had abandoned reliance on acts in
France.) 203 With regard to the “lack of adverse effects” exception, Mr. Justice Arnold commented that although he had:
found that Enterprise’s claim was made out . . . with regard to Europcar’s
acts within the United Kingdom, I made no findings with regard to the position outside the United Kingdom. Not only that, but in addition two important elements of my reasoning were expressly confined to the position within
the United Kingdom. Those were, first, the acquired distinctive character of
the [EUTM] in the form in which it had been used by Enterprise and, secondly, the evidence of actual confusion. I made no finding that there was
acquired distinctive character in Member States other than the United Kingdom, nor did I make a finding that there was actual confusion in other Member States. I made no such findings because there was no evidence to
support any such suggestion if it had been made. For example, there was no
survey evidence relating to other Member States, nor was there evidence of
actual confusion.204

This set of facts does not seem all that different from the position in
Interflora where the same judge was willing to assume that the evidence
regarding U.K. consumers should dictate the outcome throughout
sistent decisions relating to the [EU] trade mark concerned, in particular because
of the factual assessment of the likelihood of confusion. Such a consequence
runs counter to the objective of the uniform protection of the [EUTM] . . . as well
as to the unitary character of that mark . . . .
Case C-235/09, DHL Express Fr. SAS v. Chronopost SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-2801, ¶ 45. It is not
clear whether Mr. Justice Arnold intended his comment about res judicata to be limited to
an order that was geographically limited because the plaintiff restricted the scope of the
action. See Enterprise, [2015] EWHC (Ch) 300 at [30]. The operation of res judicata, at
least where—as per the alternative holding in Enterprise—relief is limited because of lack of
adverse effects elsewhere in Europe, might ameliorate the problem of inconsistent judgments. Of course, it might also force (or encourage) defendants to adduce evidence on
possible geographic variations, which may both increase costs and make the venue chosen
important as a matter of fairness. Ordinarily, international jurisdiction will vest in the
EUTM court sitting in the defendant’s domicile, but this will not likely be the case when a
non-EU defendant is sued by an EU plaintiff. The res judicata debate is of course also
heavily informed by the question of whether the EUTM compels the courts to begin to
consider the European consumer as a single construct rather than as a bundle of national
consumers. That is to say, to what extent will EUTM courts indulge a normative legal
fiction so divorced from reality? See infra notes 211–19 and accompanying text.
202 See Enterprise, [2015] EWHC (Ch) 300 at [16]–[17]. Empirical work suggests that,
surprisingly, but according to very preliminary research, EU-wide injunctions are granted
(and perhaps even claimed) in a very small percentage of cases. But it is hard at present to
determine the significance of this data.
203 Id. at [17].
204 Id. at [25].
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Europe.205 The difference in approach thus appears to rest heavily on the
variation in burden of proof that Mr. Justice Arnold has developed in doubleidentity cases.206
Whether that variation is ultimately sustained by the appellate courts in
setting the burden on the infringement claim—and arguably it should be—it
is surely better to approach the question of territorial scope of relief more
purposively, taking into account (1) the nature of the goods and services and
whether EU-wide relief is likely necessary to allow expansion into an EU-wide
market, and (2) whether the sign in question is one that is likely over time to
elicit different consumer responses throughout the EU such that the rights of
competitors to use the mark require protection in discrete, severable markets.207 At first blush, the transborder nature of car rental markets and the
culturally homogenous sign suggested that this might have been an instance
where EU-wide relief could have been appropriate, perhaps subject to proof
of uncomplicated coexistence. And the notion that past infringement had
taken place in one country, but was threatened in others, likewise appeared
to be a model of expanding commercial interaction for which the unitary
right was designed.208
Moreover, requiring a plaintiff as a matter of course to plead and prove
distinctiveness and confusion in all twenty-eight countries of the European
Union does seem to undermine the advantages of the unitary right.209 And
asking for country-by-country surveys—which the English Court of Appeal in
205 Cf. Hearst Holdings Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 439 [192].
206 In its recent decision in Combit Software GmbH v. Commit Business Solutions, Ltd., discussed below, the court described DHL (like Combit) not as a double-identity case but a
case involving “similar sign[s],” and thus governed by the classic infringement standard.
See Case C-223/15, Combit Software GmbH v. Commit Bus. Sols., Ltd., EU:C:2016:719,
¶ 31. While Combit did involve similar (rather than identical) signs, it is not clear that that
was the fact pattern in DHL. This would be relevant to whether the burden is different for
the reasons suggested by Mr. Justice Arnold.
207 Of course, most plaintiffs will assert that they hope to expand into distant EU markets. But courts (particularly in countries operating under use-based systems) have in the
past been able to sift through such claims and make determinations of whether such geographic expansion is likely. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 896 (discussing the zone
of natural expansion); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90
(1918); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d. 358 (2d Cir. 1959). And the
parallel question of likely product expansion has long been part of standard judicial analysis in infringement and relative-ground-opposition cases involving related goods, as has,
more recently, consideration of where consumer understanding of languages is converging
within the European market. And any initial uncertainties that might ensue from such a
purposive approach would no doubt be ameliorated over time with the accretion of judicial decisions.
208 See Enterprise, [2015] EWHC (Ch) 300 at [21].
209 Cf. A.S. Watson (Health & Beauty Continental Eur.) B.V. v. The Boots Co. PLC
[2011] EWPCC 026, [29]–[30] (Eng.) (granting the defendant’s request to transfer an
EUTM infringement action from the Patents County Court to the High Court because of
the inadequacy of the Patents County Court to hear evidence from all fourteen member
states where infringement was allegedly occurring). The court noted the defendant’s argument that:
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Interflora has made hard to admit on questions of confusion, over Mr. Justice
Arnold’s objections—seems likewise counterproductive in cost terms, notwithstanding that surveys of foreign consumers might be particularly helpful
to national judges adjudicating EUTM cases.210
The Court of Justice has recently hinted at its favored approach, though
again this is not without doubt and may leave the door open for national
judges to develop different approaches until the court itself steps in to clarify.
In Combit Software GmbH v. Commit Business Solutions, Ltd., a German owner of
the EUTM and German registrations for COMBIT on goods and services in
the computer industry brought an action in a German EUTM court against
an Israeli company that sold software online (at www.commitcrm.com) under
the mark COMMIT.211 The website was available in German and goods purchased there could be delivered to a German address. The Dusseldorf court
concluded that the average German consumer would be confused by the
defendant’s use, but that for the average English-speaking consumer the phonetic similarity would be cancelled out by the difference in meaning that they
would comprehend between COMBIT and COMMIT.212
Fearing that a finding of infringement of the EUTM in such a case
raised the possibility of an injunction being issued over territories where
there is no likelihood of confusion, the court asked the Court of Justice
whether, in assessing the likelihood of confusion, the perspective should be
that of the average consumer in “some Member States, of the other Member
States, or that of a fictive EU average consumer?” 213 As the court noted in
its reference, “[i]f an EU trade mark court were required to examine the
likelihood of confusion for each Member State individually, that examination
would slow the proceedings and would lead to considerable expense for the
parties.” 214
[T]he Court in [DHL] was deciding in effect that if [an EU] Trade Mark court
finds that the acts of infringement are limited to a single member state or group
of states but also finds no infringement in other member states (perhaps on linguistic grounds) then the court must limit the territorial scope of the injunction
granted. . . . [T]hat the position in each member state will need to be investigated
at trial, was accepted by [the plaintiff].
[The defendant] submitted that at least the following factors will need to be
considered for each member state: i) The reputation . . . , ii) The inherent distinctiveness . . . , iii) The de facto distinctiveness . . . , iv) The visual, aural and
conceptual similarity between [the conflicting signs], and v) The characteristics
of the average consumer.
Id.
210 See Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 92, at 360–75.
211 See Combit Software, EU:C:2016:719.
212 The court felt that the English consumer would perceive the COMBIT mark as a
combination of the terms “com” and “bit”—which the German court thought, perhaps
oddly in the latter case, were not particularly distinctive in the computer industry—and
would immediately understand the meaning of the word “commit.” See Case C-223/15,
Combit Software GmbH v. Commit Bus. Sols., Ltd., EU:C:2016:351, ¶ 12.
213 Id. ¶ 14.
214 Id. ¶ 13.
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This practical concern for the speed of adjudication is a fair critique of
the approach adopted by Mr. Justice Arnold in Enterprise.215 But the fundamental question about the conceptual nature of the European consumer at
the heart of EU trademark law had not previously been considered by the
Court of Justice. 216 And it is a tension at the heart of much trademark doctrine.217 The Dusseldorf court also asked a question that more explicitly
implicated DHL, namely, whether where there is varied consumer reaction,
“the [EU] trade mark [has] been infringed across the European Union, or
must the Member States be differentiated individually?”218 This question
brought the same prudential and conceptual points to the surface.
The Court of Justice took the view that use that creates likely confusion
with the EUTM in one part of the European Union but not in others does
give rise to an infringement claim, because the function of the mark as an
indication of origin would be adversely affected. 219 This might not be surprising given that courts in most jurisdictions may still find infringement
based upon a minority of consumers being confused. But the court did not
suggest in its reply that the outcome would be affected by the relative size of
the areas where the use would be confusing and nonconfusing, respectively,
as one might in assessing nonterritorial aspects of what is an actionable level
of confusion. The court ducked entirely the conceptual question posed by
the Dusseldorf court regarding the character of the “consumer” in such
cases. But the court’s continual reference to the different groupings of consumers suggests that the court envisages an approach not unlike that taken
by Mr. Justice Arnold in Interflora and Enterprise, where the “European consumer” group is understood as a collection of national (or linguistic) consumers, rather than a single, multilingual, “European” fiction.
Having determined that there would be infringement, the court also
made clear that, as in DHL, “legitimate trade arising from the use of the sign
in question in that part of the European Union [where confusion is not
215 See supra text accompanying notes 209–10.
216 It had been considered in the context of geographic indications, where the concept
of a European consumer had been endorsed. See Case C-75/15, Viiniverla v. Sosiaali,
EU:C:2016:35. The doctrinal approaches to questions of distinctiveness, reputation, and
scope of relief in earlier cases, as well as EUIPO examination practices, hinted at possibly
different answers in trademark law, without the Court of Justice ever having explicitly considered it.
217 See Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 92, at 364–74.
218 Combit Software, EU:C:2016:351, ¶ 14 (first alteration in original).
219 Case C-223/15, Combit Software GmbH v. Commit Bus. Sols., Ltd., EU:C:2016:719,
¶ 25. In the context of opposition proceedings, the court has consistently held that the
owner of an EUTM can successfully oppose registration of a later EUTM application where
there exists a likelihood of confusion only in part of the EU—even in cases where it is
limited to one member state. See, e.g., Order C-459/09P, Dominio de la Vega, SL v. OHIM,
2010 E.C.R. I-00111, ¶¶ 30–31; Case C-514/06 P, Armacell Enter. GmbH v. OHIM, 2008
E.C.R. I-128, ¶¶ 56–57. This is unsurprising in the context of opposition to the grant of an
EUTM, where the applicant can alternatively pursue national registrations.
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likely] cannot be prohibited.” 220 It thus sought to address how courts and
parties should approach proof of the varied territorial understanding. On
this point, recall that Mr. Justice Arnold had adopted a different method in
Enterprise than he had in Interflora. The Court of Justice’s answer in Combit is
far from clear. It appears to favor imposing the burden on the defendant,
but was somewhat vague about the nature of that burden.221 Thus, the court
noted that the “information” regarding the lack of likely confusion “must, as
a rule, be submitted to [the court] by the defendant.”222 This appears to
rule out the Enterprise approach, which places at least the initial information
burden on the plaintiff. Indeed, the Advocate General explicitly placed the
burden on the defendant,223 and expressly rejected Enterprise by name.224
But the court sent mixed signals about the nature of the burden that was
imposed on a defendant. What does “submitting information” entail, and
why does this apply only “as a rule”? Barely more clarity can be found in the
opinion of the Advocate General. The Advocate General talks explicitly in
terms of “burdens,” rather than the provision of information.225 He first suggested, with great clarity, that the “burden includes the burden of raising and
presenting an issue (onus proferendi) and the burden of proof in the strict
sense (onus probandi).”226 It was thus for the defendant to raise and demonstrate the need for a territorial limitation, because this would create what the
Advocate General saw as an exception to the unitary principle.227 However,
standards and methods of proof are matters of national procedural law (provided that those national laws do not compromise the EU goal of providing
uniform protection). And the Advocate General noted that “demonstrating
that the likelihood of confusion is geographically restricted may demand
considerable effort, particularly where that demonstration concerns a country other than that where the action is brought.”228 (Thus, it is clear that
both the approach in Enterprise and that in Interflora give rise to practical
questions of efficient adjudication. And it might be that the allocation of the
burden to plaintiff or defendant should vary depending upon the factual
issue that might cause a different result to ensue with respect to different
220 Combit Software, EU:C:2016:719, ¶ 32.
221 See Conclusions From Previous Meetings, CIRCLE OF EUROPEAN TRADEMARK JUDGES,
http://cet-j.org/?page_id=30 (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
222 See Combit Software, EU:C:2016:719, ¶ 32.
223 See Combit Software, EU:C:2016:351, ¶¶ 33–34 (AG Szpunar). Indeed, Mr. Justice
Arnold himself accepted in Enterprise that this was not clear and predicted the need for
guidance.
224 See id. ¶¶ 37, 39–40.
225 See id. ¶¶ 33–34. In one paragraph, the burden is formulated as being “that the
limitation of the prohibition must be raised by the defendant and justified in relation to a
specific part of the territory of the European Union.” See id. ¶ 36. But that passage
appears simply intended to rebut the suggestion (found in a decision of the German court
in Volkswagen) that a court should sua sponte consider such questions. See id. ¶ 38.
226 Id. ¶ 42.
227 See id. ¶ 43.
228 Id. ¶ 49.
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groups of consumers, because evidence on those factual issues might in some
cases be more available to one party or the other). These conflicting considerations appeared to push the Advocate General towards an alternative formulation: the defendant must raise and “pu[t] forward specific arguments”
about a lack of confusion and a court may (if national laws permit) require
the defendant to provide specific proof of that.229 The Court of Justice’s
ambiguity may reflect these hedges by the Advocate General.
More helpfully, the Advocate General also begins a discussion, not
picked up by the court, about the strength of the presumption of EU-wide
relief and the variables that might cause derogation. In light of the discussion in Part III above, this is a discussion with which the court could usefully
have engaged. It is unhelpful for the court simply to rely on the formalistic
notion of reading exceptions from general principles narrowly, especially
when the court has failed to tackle the conceptual questions (e.g., the nature
of the “average EU consumer”) or the normative policy questions (of
whether different forms of proof would undermine either the European project or the usefulness of a cleaner register).230 In contrast, the Advocate
General did recognize that the nature of the market that an injunction would
regulate may vary depending, for example, on the nature of the goods, or the
methods by which they were marketed. 231 (To this, one might add the
nature of the sign.) Thus, he suggested that in a case like the one before the
court, involving the “market in software sold on the internet . . . it is necessary to start from the premis[e] that the infringement concerns the entire
territory of the European Union” because a territorial limitation might
render it ineffective in violation of the principles found in the Enforcement
Directive.232
Finally, the court gave only general guidance on one of the satellite
issues raised by DHL, namely, how a court should go about crafting a territorially limited injunction. It said only that the court must identify:
with precision the part of the European Union in respect of which it finds
there to be no actual or potential adverse effect on the functions of the trade
mark, so that it is absolutely clear from the order . . . which part of the
Union is not covered by the prohibition on using the sign in question.
Where, as in the present case, that court intends to exclude from the prohibition on use certain linguistic areas of the European Union such as those
designated by the term ‘English speaking’, it must state comprehensively
which areas it intends that term to cover.233
229 Id. ¶ 49 (emphasis added).
230 Id. ¶ 29.
231 See id. ¶¶ 53–55.
232 Id. ¶ 54; see also Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of Apr. 20, 2004, on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45,
61 (EC).
233 Case C-223/15, Combit Software GmbH v. Commit Business Solutions Ltd,
EU:C:2016:719, ¶ 34.
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Caselaw within Europe has indirectly tackled some of the underlying questions, with courts opining in several cases on the countries in which English
might be understood, which might also vary depending on the nature of the
goods and the nature of the sign.234
C.

Relief in Dilution Cases

The DHL decision also brought back into play a question that was
addressed by the Advocate General in Pago v. Tirol Milch but that was left
unanswered by the court in that case. In the EU, marks “with a reputation”
obtain protection against dilution. The EUTMR explicitly states that this
additional protection will be available to EUTMs with a reputation “in the
[EU].”235 In Pago, the applicant’s EU mark had a reputation in Austria, and
nowhere else.236 But the owner wanted relief throughout the EU and thus
claimed that it had a reputation in the Union. Austria, after all, was part of
the EU. The Court of Justice held that to be protected against dilution an
EUTM must be known by a “significant part of the public . . . [in] a ‘substantial part’ of the territory . . . of the [Union].”237 Consistent with her opinion
in Leno Merken, Advocate General Sharpston explained that “an approach
which focuses on Member State boundaries when seeking to establish the
extent of [an EU] trade mark’s reputation is fundamentally misconceived.
Rather, the starting point must be to consider the territory of the [Union]
regardless of frontiers, as a single and indivisible whole.”238 The court accepted
that under this test, the territory of Austria alone might be considered to
constitute a substantial part of the territory of the Union, but left that question to the Austrian courts.239
A further question was posed to the Court of Justice in Pago, namely,
that even if reputation in Austria was sufficient to amount to reputation in
the EU, warranting dilution protection for the EUTM, could relief extend
beyond Austria to countries where no such reputation existed? The Advocate General thought that it would not because there was no need for any
wider order to be granted to further the intrinsic objectives of trademark
law.240 The Max Planck Study appeared to support this approach.241
234 See Ukulele Orchestra of Gr. Brit. v. Clausen [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1772 (Eng.).
235 EUTMR, art. 9(1)(c) (granting rights against unauthorized use of “any sign which is
identical with, or similar to, the [EU] trade mark . . . where the latter has a reputation in
the [EU] and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the [EU] trade mark”).
236 Case C-301/07, Pago Int’l GmbH v. Tirol Milch GmbH, 2009 E.C.R. I-9429.
237 Id. ¶¶ 17, 19, 20.
238 Id. ¶ 29. There is clearly an initial inconsistency between the approaches taken by
the EU courts to the territorial aspects of their distinctiveness analysis and their reputation
analysis, respectively. Cf. Case T-91/99, Ford Motor Co. v. OHIM [2000] E.T.M.R. 554
(CFI 2000). In Pago, the court appears to have accepted that it should view the EU as a
separate market, regardless of actual commercial variation.
239 See Pago Int’l, 2009 E.C.R. I-9429, ¶¶ 29–30.
240 See id. ¶¶ 53–57 (“It is seldom if ever appropriate for a court to make an order in
wider terms than are necessary. Where the infringement of the trade mark is confined to a
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Decisions from both the German and Dutch courts appear to follow that
approach.242 In Hormel v. Dukka, Hormel owned the EUTM SPAM for
canned meat products. 243 It sued Dukka in The Hague for marketing an
energy drink under the name SPAM.244 The court rejected the confusionbased claims in large part because of the dissimilarity of the products. But
that does not prevent a dilution claim. 245 Yet, that too failed. Under Pago,
Hormel’s EUTM was entitled to dilution protection if it had a reputation in a
substantial part of the Union, and one single member state can constitute
such a substantial part. Hormel established that its SPAM mark had a reputation in the United Kingdom.246 However, the Dutch court refused to grant
any relief because the defendant was not planning on using the mark in the
United Kingdom, and the SPAM mark had (according to the court) no reputation elsewhere in the EU. 247 As a result, the plaintiff could not show that
single Member State (here, Austria), it will normally be sufficient for the order prohibiting
such an infringement likewise to be confined to that single Member State. I see nothing in
the Regulation that would preclude a competent court from making an order limited in
that way.”). But note that the “likelihood” of confusion is the relevant standard for liability. See Annette Kur, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Law in Europe: The ECJ Trade Mark
Case Law 2008–2012, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 773, 785 (2013).
241 See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 3.90, at 150 (recommending that, in cases
of territorially limited reputation, dilution protection conferred by an EUTM be available
only in those parts of the Union where the mark had a reputation).
242 See Case I ZR 214/11, Trade Marks with Volks-prefix [2014] E.T.M.R. 47 (Ger. Fed.
Sup. Ct. 2013); Case C109/370493, Hormel Foods Corp. v. Dukka BV (The Hague D. Ct.
2013). Some commentators agree. See Daniel R. Bereskin, Territorial Effect of Trade Mark
Registrations: A North American Perspective, in IN VARIETATE CONCORDIA? NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN TRADEMARKS LIVING APART TOGETHER 97, 109 (2011) [hereinafter IN VARIETATE CONCORDIA] (“[I]n light of the EU’s substantial geographical extent, and its profound political,
linguistic, economic and cultural diversity, the scope of protection of [an EUTM] should
be restricted to the area of the EU in which the [EUTM] has been used or acquired a
reputation.”). Insofar as this is a restrictive view of the scope of rights, Bereskin notes the
social and technological forces that make it a less dramatic derogation from unitary rights:
[A]s a result of the Internet and other modern forms of communication, the
reputation of [an EUTM] may well extend well beyond the borders of the countries in which the trade mark initially is used, so the rights of the owner of the
[EUTM] may well be quite extensive geographically if the rights are both use and
reputation-based.
Id.
243 Case C109/370493, Hormel Foods.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. If the plaintiff acquired a reputation in the place where the defendant did use
after the defendant started using, it is not clear that there would then be relief provided
under European law. The U.S. statute is explicit on this point. Section 43(c), codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012), provides that a mark owner can enjoin another diluting use if
the diluting use begins after the mark owner’s mark has become famous. Cf. Enter. RentA-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, mark fame
for purposes of section 43(c) must be measured as of the time when the defendant’s
alleged diluting use began. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 171–73
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the defendant’s use of the SPAM sign took unfair advantage of or was detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of Hormel’s trademark.248 It
could not do so because the defendant was not using the mark where the
mark had a reputation. 249 In many respects, this is simply the intrinsic territoriality of marks reasserting itself; and it can be seen as the extended application of DHL in the dilution context. EUTMs with a reputation only in the
United Kingdom will under this approach only receive relief against uses in
the United Kingdom.
Moreover, this outcome approximates post-2006 U.S. law to some extent.
Under the 1995 U.S. dilution legislation, geographic extent of use was one
factor in the fame calculus, suggesting that locally famous marks might qualify under section 43(c) if other factors weighed in favor of fame. The 2006
Act however requires the mark to be recognized by the “general consuming
public of the United States.”250 The 2006 version of section 43(c) thus leaves
regionally or locally famous marks with a remedy only under state law in
states where the marks are famous.
In a recent case, the Court of Justice appears to be sympathetic to some
of the resistance seen in Dukka, but again its decision lacks clarity. In Iron &
Smith v. Unilever, Iron & Smith sought a Hungarian registration for the figurative sign “Be Impulsive.”251 Unilever opposed based upon its earlier EUTM
for the word IMPULSE for body spray, arguing that the Iron & Smith mark
would dilute its word mark.252 IMPULSE had no reputation in Hungary, but
(4th Cir. 2012); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir.
2004). The analysis in Europe might now be affected by the imperfectly drafted “intervening rights” defense. See ATMR art. 1(15) (adding EUTMR art. 13a); see also Case C-65/12,
Leidseplein Beheer BV v. Red Bull GmbH, EU:C:2014:49.
248 Case C109/370493, Hormel Foods.
249 Id.
250 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). The provision (section 43(c)(2)(A)) was primarily
designed to overrule the proposition that fame in a niche market could suffice for section
43(c) purposes. See Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir.
2007) (concluding that the statutory reference to “the general public” eliminates niche
market fame); see also Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633 (7th
Cir. 1999) (recognizing the niche fame concept under 1995 legislation). However, the
reference to “the United States” also appeared to have introduced a geographic dimension
to the concept. The 1995 legislation already included factors for determining fame that
contained a geographic component, and the 2006 version retained them: “[t]he duration,
extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised
or publicized by the owner or third parties”; and “[t]he amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark . . . .” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(ii); see Cosi, Inc. v. WK Holdings, LLC, No. 05-2770, 2007 WL
1288028 at *2 (D. Minn. May 1, 2007) (concluding that a franchisor that operated 110
sandwich shops in sixteen states did not show that its mark falls into the “select class of
‘famous’ marks” such as “Victoria’s Secret” and “Louis Vuitton”); see also Xuan-Thao
Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame in Trademark Law, 33 CARDOZO L. REV.
89 (2011).
251 Case C-125/14, Iron & Smith v. Unilever, EU:C:2015:539.
252 Id. ¶ 10.
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based upon sales in the United Kingdom and Italy, it had a reputation in a
substantial part of the European Union (satisfying Pago).253
The Court of Justice adopted a rule that is similar—but not identical—to
the Dutch court in Dukka. It recognized that in order to bar the Hungarian
registration, there would need to be some adverse effect on the opponent’s
interests in Hungary.254 Under Dukka, the lack of a reputation in Hungary
would arguably preclude there being anything to blur or tarnish, and no possibility of unfair advantage. But the court expressed its position in language
that is less clear:
[E]ven if the earlier [EUTM] is not known to a significant part of the relevant public in the Member State in which registration of the later national
mark has been applied for, it is conceivable that a commercially significant
part of the latter may be familiar with it and make a connection between that
mark and the later national mark.255

It is not clear how far this derogates from a commitment to unitary
relief, and it may reflect a different compromise than found in DHL of the
different forms of territoriality.256
VI. THE UNITARY PRINCIPLE AND OVERLAPPING RIGHTS:
A DEFENSE OF RESISTANCE
The relationship between expansion of trade and the territoriality of
trademarks is complex. As a purely descriptive matter, creating policy on the
assumption of a direct relationship—trade is larger, so trademarks should be
too—creates significant challenges for trademark law. Unitary rights, which
in their pure form are the fullest manifestation of this assumption, pose particular problems if the politically-drawn borders prompt rights far greater
than commercial patterns warrant. Indeed, rather than facilitating easier
clearance processes that allow for more integrated and larger markets, they
can exacerbate overlaps, create clutter and transaction costs, and thus
impede trade.
Of course, one of the justifications for the EUTM was that it might help
create a single market; unlike the U.S. statute in 1946, the legislative history
spoke to the future and not the present.257 But if trademark law actually can
253 Id. ¶ 11.
254 Id. ¶¶ 26–34.
255 Id. ¶ 30.
256 See Robert Burrell & Michael Handler, Reputation in European Trade Mark Law: A ReExamination, 17 ERA F. 85, 94 (2016) (“[A]lthough the Court did not seek to limit the
effect of DHL by suggesting there was no need to demonstrate harm to one of the functions in order to secure injunctive relief, it nevertheless made it easier to secure such relief
by lowering the reputational bar. The consequence of this aspect of Iron & Smith, which
appears to have gone unnoticed, is that the Court has now acknowledged that antidilution
harms are capable of arising in circumstances where the mark owner enjoys less than the
level of reputation needed to satisfy the Yplon threshold.”).
257 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277
(“Trade is no longer local, but is national . . . It would seem as if national legislation along

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL409.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 53

territorial overlaps in trademark law

11-MAY-17

9:02

1721

dictate changes in the level at which commercial exchange occurs, we then
have to grapple with normative questions about the benefits—and costs—of
more liberal trade, which should cause trademark law to engage with broader
political debates about the relative merits of the global and the local. To
some extent, the raison d’etre of the European Union shortcuts any such
debate, although recent political winds suggest that such questions are not
off the table.258 If, in contrast, trademark law has little effect on the reach of
markets—as opposed, for example, to language, culture, or technology—
then one might wonder why we should create the additional costs of exacerbated clutter.
At the very least, trademark law needs to engage with these questions. In
this concluding Part of the Article, I briefly raise some questions that suggest
we need to more consciously (and perhaps more normatively) seek to “rightsize” trademark protection with an eye to varied concerns.
A.

Two Paradoxes

In striking a balance between the intrinsic territoriality of marks and a
political vision of the European territory, it is worth prefacing any analysis by
recognizing two paradoxes that have been thrown up by the contemporary
political, technological, and commercial climate.
1.

Local Rights in a Regional or Global Polity

The reluctance of European courts to follow the unitary principle without question is in part a function of the growing size and diversity of the EU
market. In 1957, the European Economic Community was a smaller grouping of relatively similar countries. A unitary mark then would have imposed a
political notion of territoriality not that far removed from social and commercial understandings. In a union of twenty-eight countries and twentythree languages, reconciling the intrinsically territorial dimension to consumer understanding with the vast politically-created borders will require
greater flexibilities. This is reflected in some of the developing caselaw and
in some of the policy debates about scope of relief. There are good reasons
why courts have resisted.
To state the matter more conceptually, just as there are problems with
trademark law lagging too far behind the marketplace, so too the challenges
for trademark law become acute if it moves too far ahead of the commercial
market. Despite the rhetoric of a global marketplace, linguistic, cultural, and
other forces ensure the maintenance of local and regional markets. And that
national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate commerce definite rights
should be enacted.”).
258 See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Does Trump’s Election Spell Globalisation’s End?, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/nov/17/does-trumps-election-spell-end-for-globalisation; Larry Elliott, Brexit Is a Rejection of Globalisation, GUARDIAN
(June 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/26/brexit-is-the-rejection-of-globalisation.
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might not be a bad thing, if we value the joy of difference in an integrated
community. Indeed, that is to some extent what prompted the endorsement
of territoriality as a principle of international intellectual property law in the
first place. Courts and policymakers in the European Union are now being
confronted with this reality.
In the short term, European courts and legislators will continue to face
difficulties in reconciling the different demands of the political and intrinsic
territoriality of marks. Perhaps, for countries who have not yet mimicked the
EU experiment, this suggests harder thinking might be warranted about
more incremental approaches to the problems of territoriality. For example,
in the United States, over the years, judicial interpretation of core concepts
in trademark law (such as “use” or “distinctiveness,” or more fundamentally
“the ordinarily prudent American consumer”) has managed without vast disruption to incorporate changing social and commercial practices that affect
the actual territorial reach of consumer understanding.259 This might be a
more conservative approach, but it needs still to be kept on the table as an
alternative approach to unitary rights in contexts where the patterns of social
and commercial exchange have not yet approached the political territory for
which the unitary scheme is sought to be imposed.
Indeed, some aspects of the debates in this Article will be familiar to U.S.
trademark lawyers. Bona fide use anywhere in the United States (nominally,
in interstate commerce, but this is a minimal threshold) will maintain the
federal registration;260 and that registration secures nationwide priority and
potential U.S.-wide relief.261 Thus, a U.S. lawyer might wonder why one
might resist the full force of unitary rights. But the commercial significance
of this geographic extension of legal rights in advance of commercial reality
is far greater (and perhaps more troubling) in the European Union where,
because of linguistic and cultural diversity, there remain far more numerous
distinct markets where these formal legal rights impede competitors for no
realistic commercial purpose. And even U.S. courts have long recognized
remedial limits on the enforcement of federally-registered rights against local
traders where commercial activity is less than national. The Dawn Donut rule
is probably the best-known example.262 There, the Second Circuit denied
injunctive relief to a senior user with a federal registration, which conferred
nationwide rights.263 Confusion would have arisen if goods of both parties
had been sold in the same region, but relief was denied because the senior
user had no plans to enter the market where the injunction was sought.264
Although the court recognized the superior rights of the senior user, which
259 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 896 (discussing the zone of natural expansion
and definition of “use”).
260 For a recent example, see Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. adidas AG, 841 F.3d
986 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
261 See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2012).
262 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d. 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
263 Id. at 366.
264 Id. at 365.
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were sufficient therefore to offer the senior user the certainty in the national
market that registration is intended to confer, it also sought to recognize the
goodwill that had developed in a particular locale and would not preempt
that goodwill without good reason.265
Might we simply argue that the DHL rule is an echo of Dawn Donut?
There are some differences. In DHL, the argument for confining the injunction to France was not that the plaintiff and defendant were using their
marks in different markets (though that might have been the case on the
facts). Rather the use of the mark in different countries within the EU might
for linguistic reasons lead to different conclusions on confusion (or perhaps
the applicability of the descriptive fair use defense) and hence infringement.
This does seem somewhat at odds with a unitary EU-wide priority. Similarly,
in Dawn Donuts, as soon as the federal right holder expanded trade, it would
have secured relief. In contrast, if the plaintiff in Enterprise expanded its
trade into areas of the European Union not covered by the injunction (or, to
map to Dawn Donut, had plans to do so) it is not clear that the defendant
would immediately have had to cease trading under the contested logo. This
would have depended upon whether the inability of the plaintiff to prove
acquired distinctiveness turned on mere lack of use in the territory in question or whether this was inherent in the prevailing cultural, political, or linguistic climate. Indeed, if the defendant had continued to trade and
acquired its own distinctiveness, the picture becomes even more complicated
and trademark policy might demand the recognition of coexisting trademarks. This possibility is contemplated by the decision of the Court of Justice
in Budejovicky Budvar.266 And the recent introduction of intervening rights
defenses in the 2015 European Trade Mark Regulation is also fully consistent
with that philosophy. 267
The DHL decision in one sense simply reflects the enduring power of
the intrinsic territoriality of marks. The political process may have decreed
that there is a unitary mark operating in a single market. But the courts fully
appreciate that that is not the commercial reality. And as the European
Union expands in size and diversity—Brexit notwithstanding—this impulse
on the part of courts will become even stronger. Such an approach might be
265 Id. at 362.
266 See C-482/09, Budějovický Budvar, národnı́ podnik v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 2011
E.C.R. I-8701; see also Budejovicky Budvar NP v. Anheuser-Busch Inc. [2009] EWCA (Civ)
1022, ¶ 12 (Jacob, L.J.) (“I make no apology for this lengthy quotation [from an earlier
English case discussing the principle of honest concurrent use under English common
law]. I believe it has important lessons for us today. Just as the expansion of trade within
an individual nation state of the 19th century required trade mark law to accommodate
cases where two owners had independently and honestly commenced use of their respective but identical or confusingly similar marks, so in today’s globalising market there may
be a need for a similar accommodation. And that is particularly true of the law of the
European Union, one of whose main purposes is to have a single market.”).
267 See ATMR, art. 1(15) (adding EUTMR art. 13a); cf. Case C-65/12, Leidseplein
Beheer BV v. Red Bull GmbH, EU:C:2014:49.
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warranted not only to effectuate the intrinsic territoriality of marks, but also
to address the problem of cluttering of the register.
2.

The Interdependence-and-Scope Paradox

We should also bear in mind what might be called the interdependenceand-scope paradox: Does interdependence of trade mean that mark owners
need the capacity to secure and enforce exclusive rights in a greater number
of places (or across a larger geographic area) or, paradoxically, that the grant
of such relief in a single place might be sufficient effectively to exercise the
rights throughout a larger territory? In an integrated global market, a plaintiff might not need relief everywhere to secure the desired practical result.268
Of course, this demonstrates the potentially excessive power of even national
relief and the extent to which a nominal commitment to territoriality hardly
guarantees sovereignty in the face of the realities of a truly integrated market.
And it may explain preliminary data suggesting that plaintiffs frequently seek
relief for a territory less than the entire EU notwithstanding the availability of
international jurisdiction under the EUTMR. Relief in the principal markets
may, in some cases, be sufficient to decide the battle throughout Europe.
Whether the defendant retaliates by pursuing the plaintiff in other markets
within the territory that are also of commercial significance will turn on many
factors, including the nature of the businesses, the respective market penetration, and the nature of the European market (whether fully integrated or
not, which may be affected by the goods and services at issue). This is the
private law version of what I have previously characterized in sovereignty
terms, namely, that globalization has created an excess of nonexclusive prescriptive jurisdiction.269
B.

Institutional and Conceptual Design

In Part II of this Article, I raised the question whether supranational
political institutions are sufficient to ensure the success of a system of unitary
rights. The institutional design choices made by the drafters of the EUTMR,
as well as the (perhaps politically and practically understandable) cautious
vision of the European consumer adopted by the courts, have to some extent
slowed the full embrace of unitary trademark rights in Europe. The rule
adopted in DHL, and its later development by the U.K. courts in particular,
268 See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1220–21 (W.D.
Wash. 2004); Lindows and Microsoft Settle Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at C11. For a more
recent example, on September 2, 2016, after contentious U.K. litigation, see Maier v. ASOS
PLC & ASOS.com Ltd. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 220, U.K. retailer ASOS announced it had
reached a global settlement regarding trademark infringement disputes with Assos of Switzerland GmbH (“Assos”) and Anson’s Herrenhaus KG (“Anson”) by agreeing to pay £20.2
million. See Press Release, ASOS PLC, ASOS Settles Trade Mark Disputes (Sept. 2, 2016),
http://www.asosplc.com/~/media/Files/A/ASOS/results-archive/statement/asos-announ
cement-02092016.pdf.
269 See Dinwoodie, supra note 138.
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arguably highlights the limits of imposing a rule of political territoriality without fully instantiating conceptual approaches or political institutions most
appropriate to that commitment.
Because EU trademark courts are actually national judges sitting in their
home courts wearing EU hats, they will tend to analyze questions of consumer association and confusion as national actors (in part also because the
evidence put before such national judges will also likely have a “national”
focus). French EUTM courts will, as they decide questions of French confusion day-in, day-out, tend to view questions through a French lens. German
EUTM courts will tend to view the same questions through a German lens.
But if the supraterritorial commitment of the EUTM is the dominant and
overriding political goal, designed to create an integrated commercial and
political union of twenty-eight countries, the relevant question should be
viewed through the lens of a European consumer. The Court of Justice consciously ducked that question when it was presented in Combit. How methodologically one implements a particular vision of the European project, such
as via the elaboration of a European consumer, is thus crucial to the imposition of a full unitary model.270
Moreover, might judicial reaction to the possible derogations from the
unitary principle have been different had the EU made the decision to create
autonomous EU trademark courts with composition and jurisdiction closer
to that put in place for the Unitary Patent?271 (We might have had a good
comparative experiment if the Unified Patent Court system becomes a reality, but that eventuality is far from clear. And patents may in any event not be
a true comparator in that they may lack the intrinsic territoriality of trademarks, turning more on the universality of technology than the locality of
language and culture.) But because national courts have been simply commandeered in aid of the European project, the EU legislature has arguably
not provided the institutional infrastructure to facilitate the politicallydesired shift (even if other reasons related to the nature of marks and the
vision of Europe suggest this is not necessarily a bad result).272
270 The extent to which courts will indulge a normative legal fiction divorced from
reality implicates many questions in addition to the nature of the European project. See
Dinwoodie, supra note 18.
271 See Council Document No. 16351/12 of Jan. 11, 2013, Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J. (C 175/1). The Unified Patent Court (UPC) structure is ambitious
and largely autonomous. It will have exclusive competence in respect of European patents
and European patents with unitary effect. Although legally qualified judges will require
the qualifications necessary for appointment to judicial offices in a Contracting Member
State, many (especially as the court grows) might have no parallel national duties. And any
panel of the UPC shall have a multinational composition.
272 In some respects, the legislation did introduce provisions mediating relations
between national and EU institutions and national and EU marks that on their face
seemed to advance the need for single EU-wide determinations. See, e.g., EUTMR, supra
note 7, art. 109 (governing successive and simultaneous actions on national and EU marks
and institutions). But these have been narrowly interpreted. See Hearst Holdings Inc. v.
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Of course, in the United States, federal judges do think of themselves
essentially as American consumers. But in the United States, the political
territory and the commercial and social territories are relatively congruent.
In the European Union, this is not the case. We have created the legal fiction of a unitary market, where in reality the market is quite different. Asking the question from the perspective of a “European consumer” would
involve the creation of a sizeable fiction (though the average consumer is in
European law to some extent already a fiction).273
Recognizing the complex and normative character of these territorialityrelated issues might help identify the further reforms that are necessary in
the EU. If the EU wishes to recognize the importance of the intrinsic territoriality of marks while pushing the political imperatives of a united Europe,
this will involve the development of doctrinal devices that take greater
account of actual use and patterns of commerce. If instead the political purpose of the EUTM is that marks are to move in advance of markets, then
lawmakers must provide the guidance and the political machinery to consolidate this initiative—such as creating real EU-level courts, or requiring courts
to ask questions in terms of the EU as the relevant territory and with respect
to a notional European consumer. 274 It may also require attention to methodological or evidentiary matters, on which the Union is presently deferential to national tradition. For example, the U.K. courts are currently
retrenching on the relevance of survey evidence or witness collection exercises. 275 But it may require greater reliance on external empirical evidence
to allow national judges moonlighting as EUTM courts to don the mantle of
the European consumer than it does for them to approximate a British consumer. In Europe, the gap between intrinsic, commercial territoriality and
political, nonterritorial aspirations is too wide to be bridged without much
more aggressive political changes. And the appetite for such changes does
not appear to exist.

A.V.E.L.A. Inc. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 1553; Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. [2003] EWCA (Civ) 327.
273 See Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC [2013] EWHC (Ch) 1291, ¶¶ 208–11.
The use of this fiction masks normative policy judgments (about levels of paternalism) and
is also inevitable in a registration system both because use by a right owner sometimes has
not occurred and because taking a finely-grained empirical measure of consumer reaction
may be too expensive for courts to pursue given the limited gains in terms of more tailored
relief. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law, in TRADE
MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 140 (Lionel Bently et al., eds. 2008).
274 See Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 89 (discussing the use of national judges as part of
harmonization efforts).
275 See generally Marks & Spencer PLC v. Interflora Inc. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 1501
(Eng.). One can arguably see similar moves afoot in Canada and Australia. See, e.g., Masterpiece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc. [2011] 2 S.C.R. 387 (Can.); Kimberlee Weatherall,
The Consumer as the Empirical Measure of Trade Mark Law, 80 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2017).
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Concrete Reform Proposals

Judicial Resistance: Developing Interpretations of Leno Merken and
DHL

Despite the criticism of decisions by the U.K. courts in Sofaworks and
Enterprise, the approaches that are haltingly being considered by those courts
reflect some of the concerns above. The uncertainties of Court of Justice
caselaw also suggest that there is some caution at that court about a full
embrace of the unitary principle. Finally, preliminary empirical work suggests that in practice, EU-wide relief is being sought far less frequently than
one might assume. This might flow from the interdependence-and-scope
paradox noted above, and lack of requests for EU-wide relief might be due to
a lack of certainty post-DHL regarding the conditions under which it might
be available. But it might also reflect that private coexistence agreements
have long structured the practice of trademark law, and that as clutter
becomes more problematic the need for less aggressive assertions of scope is
apparent to market actors. In any event, the questions raised in Sofaworks
and Enterprise, and bubbling beneath the surface in Court of Justice caselaw,
need to be taken further by policymakers and courts (including in tackling
the questions of genuine use or scope of relief).
2.

Elevating Use-Based Devices

Courts even in unitary registration systems feel compelled to take into
account the realities of more local and market-specific use. 276 And this may
be desirable for the reasons discussed above. The Max Planck Study proposed to reform EU law to better reflect the concept of well-known marks.
The Directive and the Regulation include well-known marks within the earlier marks that can be asserted as the basis for a relative ground of objection.277 But there is no express requirement to provide protection for such
marks outside the registration context.278 The Study contemplated (but did
not definitively endorse) the concept of a mark “well-known in the [Union],”
which would effectively grant unregistered well-known mark protection
throughout the European Union. This (along with national well-known
mark provisions for smaller cross-border effects) might be a better avenue for
transborder protection in the EU (subject to Iron & Smith) than broadening
registered rights without regard to use.
276 See Bereskin, supra note 242, at 107 (“[A] system that is at least partially use-based
rather than registration-based seems better suited to serve the needs of the EU given its
substantial geographic size, and the economic, linguistic, cultural and political diversity of
the nations comprising the EU.”).
277 See 2008 Trade Mark Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(1); EUTMR, supra note 7, art.
8(2)(c).
278 Member states typically include such protection in their national laws. See, e.g.,
Trade Marks Act 1994, § 56 (Eng.).
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Embracing Coexistence of Registered Rights
In its Study, the Max Planck Institute also proposed that:
The registration and use of subsequent national trade marks in a Member State remote from the part of the [Union] where a conflicting earlier
[EUTM], which has been registered for a period of at least 15 years, was
used should be allowed provided that the later mark was applied for in good
faith. Such registrations should coexist with the earlier [EUTM] which continues to be valid and enforceable and may also be used in that Member
State. It should be explicitly set out in the rule that it only applies to
[EUTM]s if only minimal use of the [EUTM] has been made in a part of the
[Union] which is distant from the relevant Member State.279

The proposal was grounded both in the changed circumstances of the
European Union as a more diverse territory than in 1957 (or 1994) and more
generally in the nature of market realities. It was moreover consistent with
commercial practice, where coexistence is an accepted and frequently-negotiated norm. The authors of the Study (correctly) did not believe that such a
rule would interfere with the unitary character of the EUTM.280 But the proposal met with substantial resistance and ultimately was not included in the
proposals submitted by the European Commission that led to the 2015
reform of EU trademark law.
To be sure, the Max Planck proposal went beyond the temporary limit
on remedies that Dawn Donut endorsed in the United States, and perhaps
approximated the concept of concurrent users embodied in section 2(d) of
the Lanham Act.281 But the underlying concept is surely implicit in the
Court of Justice’s Budweiser decision.282 And the need for such a limitation is
greater in the context of the European Union where the unitary market is so
frequently inconsistent with commercial reality. In light of this legislative
inertia, it will be no surprise, perhaps, if national courts take matters into
their own hands and interfere with the premise of EU-wide relief in order to
elevate commercial reality over the legal form of an EU-wide registration.283
279 See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 3.31, at 139.
280 See Roland Knaak & Philipp Venohr, Coexistence in Future European Trade Mark Law,
in IN VARIETATE CONCORDIA, supra note 242, at 169, 178; see also Roland Knaak et al., The
Study on the Functioning of the European Trade Mark System 4 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual
Prop. & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-13, 2012) (suggesting that the proposal
does not “constitute an abandonment of the unitary principle, but instead merely takes
account of the existence of different conditions on individual submarkets within the EU”).
281 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012).
282 See Case C-482 C-482/09, Budejovicky Budvar, narodnı́ podnik v. Anheuser-Busch
Inc. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 880.
283 Dan Bereskin has offered a variant on the Max Planck proposal. See Bereskin, supra
note 242, at 108 (“[A]n applicant should be entitled to apply for a concurrent [EUTM] . . .
in a defined geographic area of the EU provided that the use of the concurrent [EUTM] is
unlikely to cause confusion with a [senior national or CTM registration] that was issued
more than five years before.”). Bereskin supports this proposal in part by the need to
reduce the very high rate of oppositions in the EUTM system to date. Id.
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Right to (Nonexclusive) Use Defenses

A single prior right under national law should of course be an impediment to a later conflicting right that extended throughout the entire European Union. But if statutory provision is made to recognize the continuing
validity of the earlier right, the grant of a unitary registration (subject to the
earlier right) may seem less problematic. As regards absolute grounds, on
the other hand, granting rights in a term that is descriptive in a single country (language) would provide the EUTM owner with an anticompetitive
advantage in that country or other countries where that language is understood. Should that be an impediment to a unitary right? Clearly, under current law it will be.284 But could the problem of the (nonproprietary) rights
of competitors be protected without denying an EUTM, but instead affording
a descriptive fair use defense to the users of that descriptive term in the country or area in question? This is in fact what the German Supreme Court
effectively did in a national case involving marks where there was a different
understanding within the Turkish and non-Turkish speaking
communities.285
To be sure, a descriptive fair use defense may provide insufficient certainty for defendants in receipt of cease and desist letters invoking facially
valid EUTMs covering the entire Union. The descriptive fair use defense is
notoriously fact-specific. And relying on this defense as the principal vehicle
by which to validate local uses might cause complications if goods from the
country flowed into other parts of the EU where the term was not descriptive,
effectively competing with the EUTM branded goods. But this is precisely
the same result that would pertain if we force the applicant to resort to
national registrations, secured in the countries where the term is not descriptive but denied where it is. We actually do conceive of, and regulate, separate
284 But only until acquired distinctiveness is shown. To some extent, the approach of
the Court of Justice, in requiring applicants to overcome a descriptiveness objection in
every part of the EU where it might arise, forestalls the questions. See supra note 195. But
if the court were to embrace fully the concept of a “European” consumer, it might become
a live concern.
285 See Case I ZR 23/02, Gazoz, GRUR 947 (Ger. Fed. Ct. of Justice 2004). The case is
not reported in English but is discussed by Annette Kur in her 2005 ATRIP paper. See
Annette Kur, Language and Intellectual Property: Trademarks in European Law 1, 8 (ATRIP
Paper, 2005), http://atrip.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Kur-Language-and-Intellectual-Property.doc (“One of these concerned the trade mark ‘Gazoz’, which is registered as
[an EUTM] for mineral water and other non-alcoholic beverages. In the Turkish language, this is a clearly descriptive term, as ‘Gazoz’ means ‘sparkling water’. On products
offered by a competitor mainly in shops regularly frequented by customers of Turkish origin, the term ‘Gazoz’ was displayed in a trade mark-like fashion, in connection with his
registered mark ‘marmara’. The Düsseldorf Court of Appeal had considered this to constitute an infringement of the [EUTM]. The decision was however reversed by the German
Federal Supreme Court, who argued that in the situation at hand, the use of the term was
covered by Art. 12 lit. b) [EUTMR], the provision allowing for ‘fair use’ of a sign for
descriptive purposes.” (footnote omitted)); see also MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50,
¶ 3.41, at 14.
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sub-markets in other areas of trademark law—for example, consider the
relief in the U.S. Aspirin case, where the retail and pharmacist markets warranted separate treatment—but the supposition appears to be that those are
less likely to confuse than geographically distinct markets in adjacent countries. 286 The empirical basis of such a supposition might be worth testing.
5.

Temporary Nonenforceability

Globalization and the manifestations of it have prompted courts to consider whether rules such as Dawn Donut—which temporarily limit enforcement by the senior user—need to be jettisoned in a further push to move
from local, territorial rights to rights of a more national and thence global
dimension.287 But decisions discussed above, resisting the full logic of unitary EU-wide rights, illustrate that they may perhaps be even more valuable in
today’s climate.288 Even a small period of latitude might allow a local junior
producer to effect a transfer of goodwill to a new mark and thus ensure competitive differentiation in the marketplace.
D.

Hardly a Radical Resistance

Lest it be thought that any of these suggestions were a radical intrusion
on the current philosophy of unitary rights prevailing in Europe, it is worth
highlighting that several aspects of the current system—some in place since
1996, and others introduced as part of the expansion of the European Union
or the 2015 reforms—are fully consistent with some of the derogations advocated in this Article.
1.

The “Emmenthal Cheese” Provisions

The EUTMR in its original incarnation recognized that national and
even local rights might continue to exist even though they were not asserted
to deny the grant of a EUTM for a later potentially conflicting mark. Thus,
Article 110 preserved “right[s] existing under the laws of the Member States
to invoke claims for infringement of earlier rights . . . in relation to the use of
a later [Union] trade mark.”289 Likewise, Article 111(1) provides that the
owner of a right that “only applies to a particular locality” may enjoin the use
286 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
287 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Carmax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1057 (6th Cir. 1999)
(Jones, J., concurring) (“Entering the new millennium, our society is far more mobile than
it was four decades ago. For this reason, and given that recent technological innovations
such as the Internet are increasingly deconstructing geographical barriers for marketing
purposes, it appears . . . that a re-examination of precedents would be timely to determine
whether the Dawn Donut Rule [as to likelihood of entry] has outlived its usefulness.”).
288 See Dinwoodie, supra note 13, at 964 (“If this trend continues, the remedial lesson of
Dawn Donut will be even more valuable in the future. As rights expand into a variety of
countries, a greater number of conflicts will arise and nuanced remedies may indeed be
the only means of reconciling competing interests.”).
289 EUTMR, supra note 7, art. 110.
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of the EUTM in the locality where its right exists if permitted by the law of
the member state concerned. 290 Both provisions contemplate the possible
exclusion of the EUTM owner from the national or local market, thus creating holes in the unitary nature of the EUTM.
These provisions are subject to an acquiescence caveat that might prevent the local right owner from enjoining use.291 But even when such acquiescence has occurred, the EUTM owner is not entitled to oppose the local
use of the right even if that right can no longer be invoked against the Union
trademark.292 The effect of caveats such as Article 111(3) is to endorse coexistence of conflicting rights, likewise derogating from the unitary nature of
the EUTM.
This is entirely consistent with the decision of the Court of Justice in the
Budweiser dispute, where the court effectively recognized the viability of honest concurrent use as a defense to an attempt to challenge a later mark (even
where the earlier mark owner had not formally acquiesced in the later
use).293 And it is at one with the intervening rights defense introduced,
albeit imperfectly, by the 2015 reforms.294 This “defense” seeks to prevent a
later mark being invalidated or its use prohibited where the earlier mark
owner could not have done so at the time of the later mark owner’s application; this provision extends existing immunity from cancellation to immunity
from being sued for infringement.295 Thus, Article 13a of the EUTMR provides that in infringement proceedings, the EUTM owner shall not be entitled to prohibit the use of a later registered EU (or national) trademark
where that later trademark would not be declared invalid pursuant to various
stated grounds for invalidity. But despite that, Article 13a(3) provides that
“the proprietor of that later registered trade mark shall not be entitled to
prohibit the use of that earlier EU trademark in infringement proceedings.”296 A narrower version of this was already in CTMR Article
290 See id. art. 111(1).
291 See id. art. 111(2) (“Paragraph 1 shall cease to apply if the proprietor of the earlier
right has acquiesced in the use of the [EU] trade mark in the territory where his right is
protected for a period of five successive years, being aware of such use, unless the [EU]
trade mark was applied for in bad faith.”); id. art. 110 (providing that such claims may no
longer be invoked if the proprietor of the earlier right is unable to obtain a declaration of
invalidity in accordance with EUTMR art. 54(2)).
292 See id., art. 111(3).
293 See C-482/09 Budejovicky Budvar, narodnı́ podnik v. Anheuser-Busch Inc. [2012]
EWCA (Civ) 880; see also Budějovický Budvar NP v. Anheuser-Busch Inc. [2009] EWCA
(Civ) 1022, ¶ 12 (Jacob, L.J.). It is also consistent with the philosophy of coexistence of
conflicting trademarks and geographic indications that informs EU law. See generally World
Trade Org., WT/DS174/R, Panel Report: European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, (2005),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds174_e.htm.
294 ATMR, supra note 7, art. 1(15) (adding EUTMR art. 13a).
295 See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 2.278–2.282, at 125–26.
296 ATMR, supra note 7, art. 1(15) (adding EUTMR art. 13a).
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57(2)–(3),297 and it looks like a variant of acquiescence (but for the fact that
the earlier mark owner had not really been in a position to oppose or sue
because of some deficiency in its mark at the time). Again, however, this
facilitates the likelihood of coexistent rights within a unitary system.
2.

The Expansion Compromise

As a general rule, a prior national right can defeat an application for an
EUTM. However, a compromise position was adopted when the European
Union underwent enlargement in 2004. At that time, the geographic scope
of the EUTM was extended to the territories of the newly-admitted member
states. However, prior national rights were preserved in a compromise
embodied in what is now Article 165 (along with Articles 110–11); holders of
earlier rights in new member states can enforce their rights against extended
EUTMs as permitted by their respective national legislation, provided that
the earlier right was registered, applied for, or acquired in good faith in the
new member state prior to the date of accession of that state.298 This compromise has served as the powerful rhetorical springboard for advocates seeking to contemplate a scope for EUTMs tied more to empirical realities of
likely confusion rather than the political purity of unitary rights.299 When
the European Union has expanded the reach of the EUTM with the accession of new member states, coexistence has been an important policy tool,
and it has largely worked without great impediments to trade or uncertainty
costs.
CONCLUSION
This Article endorses the role of national (or at least sub-Union) rights
not simply as a necessary irritant flowing from the nature of trademarks (thus
precluding, it is argued, the switch to an exclusively federal right that might
be theoretically more possible with finite rights such as copyright or patent).
Such national or subnational rights should perhaps be embraced normatively
297 EUTMR, supra note 7, § 57(2). Under that provision, later EUTMs acquired at a
time when a potentially conflicting EUTM or earlier national mark was in theory subject to
revocation on grounds of non-use were protected from later cancellation by invocation of
that earlier right (when that earlier right was used). Id.
298 See Communication No. 05/03 of the President of the Office of Oct. 16, 2003, Concerning the Enlargement of the European Union in 2004, 2004 O.J. OHIM 10/04, 69, § II,
para. 3 (“The extended [EUTM] would be valid and enforceable in the entire EU, including the new Member State, but not against an earlier conflicting national right. The
extended [EUTM] would thus not only not be enforceable against an earlier national
right, but the holder of such a right [could] prohibit the use of the extended [EUTM] in
his territory.”).
299 See MAX PLANCK STUDY, supra note 50, ¶ 3.24, at 137 (noting an analogy to Dawn
Donut and the enlargement compromise); Bereskin, supra note 242, at 107 (“[The enlargement compromise] raises the question whether [an EUTM] should be entitled to exist
throughout the EU even if there are prior national rights in one or more countries, provided this does not lead to a likelihood of confusion.”).
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as part of a trademark agenda that blends regard for economic expansion,
free movement of goods, consumer protection, and economic efficiency
(encompassing transaction costs) with the maintenance of diverse social, cultural, and linguistic traditions within Europe.
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ANNEX
FIGURE 1

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) by filing office in
the EU member states, Benelux, and the EUIPO for the period 1995–2015.
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FIGURE 2

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
Austrian trademark office for the period 1995–2015.

FIGURE 3

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
Benelux trademark office for the period 1995–2015.
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FIGURE 4

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
Spanish trademark office for the period 1995–2015.

FIGURE 5

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
Polish trademark office for the period 1995–2015.
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FIGURE 6

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
Czech trademark office for the period 1995–2015.

FIGURE 7

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
Hungarian trademark office for the period 1995–2015.
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FIGURE 8

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
Bulgarian, Croatian, Cypriot, Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
Maltese, Slovakian, and Slovenian trademark offices for the period 1995–2015.

FIGURE 9

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
EUIPO for the period 1996–2015.
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FIGURE 10

Top ten EUTM-filing countries for the period 1996–2015.
FIGURE 11

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
UKIPO for the period 1995–2015.
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FIGURE 12

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
German trademark office for the period 1995–2015.

FIGURE 13

Total trademark applications (both direct and via the Madrid system) filed before the
French trademark office for the period 1995–2015.
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FIGURE 14

Total trademark registrations (both direct and via the Madrid system) before the
EUIPO for the period 1996–2015.

FIGURE 15

Total number of trademarks in force at the Benelux, German, and U.K. national
trademark offices for the period 2001–2015.
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FIGURE 16

Total number of trademarks in force at the German national office for the period
2001–2015.

FIGURE 17

Total number of trademarks in force at the U.K. national trademark office for the
period 2001–2015.
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FIGURE 18

Total number of EUTMs in force at the EUIPO for the period 2005–2015.

FIGURE 19

Applications via the Madrid system designating the USPTO for the period
2004–2015.
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